









Title of Dissertation: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
IMPACTING HOSPITAL PATIENT 
OUTCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES.   
  
 Heng Wei, Ph.D., 2006 
  
Directed By: Professor William N. Evans, 
Department of Economics 
 
 
This dissertation is two essays that examine the impact of two distinct structural 
changes in hospitals.  The first essay examines whether legislated changes in the 
minimum postpartum length of stay improve health outcomes for newborns.  The 
second essay examines the consequences of nurse unions in hospitals.   
 Much of the previous research about the relationship between postpartum 
length of stay and patient outcomes are potentially subject to an omitted variable bias 
because sicker newborns usually stay longer in the hospital.  We overcome this 
problem by using passages of early discharge laws as a quasi experiment that 
generated exogenous increase in length of postpartum stays.  The California 
Newborn’s and Mother’s Health Act of 1997 effective on August 26, 1997, mandated 
that private insurance carriers provide coverage for at least 48-hour hospital stays for 
normal deliveries and 96-hour hospital stays for cesarean deliveries.  A similar 
federal law went into effect on January1, 1998.  Using an interrupted time series 
design, we demonstrate that early discharge laws reduced considerably the fraction of 
  
newborns and mothers who were discharged early.  In two-stage least square models 
using the state and Federal law as instruments for the length of hospital stay, we find 
that an additional day in the hospital reduces the probability of readmission by about 
one percentage point for complicated vaginal deliveries and c-sections of all types.  
For uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, we find there was no statistically significant 
change in 28-day newborn readmission rates.   
 The second essay examines the impact of nurse unionization in hospitals on 
wages, hours, staffing ratio of nursing personnel.  Using hospital-level panel data 
merged with data on union elections from the National Labor Relations Board, we 
compare the outcomes of nursing personnel in hospitals that became unionized during 
the sample period with hospitals that did not change union status.  The results indicate 
that unions have a small negative impact on nurse wage rates and they encourage 
hospitals to use a larger fraction of contract employees.  These difference-in-
difference estimates also indicate that cross-sectional regressions tend to overstate the 
wage gains of union because unions are more likely to appear in higher-wage 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
The determinants of inpatient outcomes are an important research topic in the 
medical and social sciences.  Patient characteristics, such as age, sex, race, 
occupation, socioeconomic status, the type of insurance, and the characteristics of 
illness are but a few of the factors that predict inpatient outcomes.  Likewise, 
characteristics of the hospital and the type of care such as the intensity of health care 
use, hospital ownership, staff levels as well as other organizational features of the 
hospital also predict outcomes.  In the dissertation, we contribute to this literature by 
examining two characteristics of hospital care that may impact outcomes:  longer 
postpartum length of stays and the union status of nurses. 
 
1.1 The Length of Postpartum Hospital Stays and Patient Outcomes 
The standard health production function is assumed to be a concave function 
of health inputs but there is a question about whether expenditures have positive 
returns at higher levels of spending.  The US in 2004, for example, spent roughly 16 
percent of its GDP on health care or approximately $5,267 per person, an amount 
substantially higher than any other country in the OECD.  Even with these startling 
numbers, the US ranks near the bottom among industrialized countries in health 
outcomes such as life expectancy and infant mortality.  Subsequently, researchers in a 
number of disciplines have attempted to estimate the marginal productivity of health 




In the first essay of this dissertation, we contribute to this literature by 
examining whether longer postpartum hospital stays improve patient outcomes.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the lengths of postpartum hospital stays declined for 
both vaginal and cesarean births. Various factors were responsible for this decline 
including the rise of managed care and an effort to de-medicalize the birth process.  In 
recent years, however, a number of authors began to question whether the decline had 
been too large and policy makers began to wonder whether infants and mothers were 
discharged too early.  The main adverse effects of an early discharge are that mothers 
and newborns are no longer under clinical observation during the early postpartum 
period, increasing the risk of a subsequent re-admission and possibly mortality.  In 
this context, the key question is what an additional day in the hospital has on the 
marginal effect of readmission and mortality rates of mothers and newborns.     
Many previous researches have examined this question by comparing, in a 
cross section, length of stay and hospital re-admission rates.  These studies are 
however subject to three persistent problems.  First, samples sizes are often of an 
insufficient size to detect effects on rare outcomes such as readmission and mortality 
rates.  Second, many of these studies lacked detailed control variables, especially 
measures of pregnancy complications.  And third, infants assigned longer postpartum 
hospital stays are not a random selection of newborns but rather, tend to be children 
with more complications.  Few studies had exploited experimental variation in the 
covariate of interest (postpartum length of stay) to solve the problem of selection bias.  




In the mid 1990s, health professionals and policy makers expressed concern 
that shorter hospital stays might jeopardize the health of both mothers and newborns.  
Tragic stories of mothers and newborns discharged early who later developed life-
threatening but preventable conditions fueled the desire of legislatures to address this 
issue.  The federal government and states responded by passing laws requiring 
insurance carriers provide coverage for longer postpartum stays.  One such law was 
the California Newborn’s and Mother’s Health Act of 1997, which went into effect on 
August 26, 1997, and mandated that insurance carriers provide coverage for at least 
48-hour hospital stays for normal deliveries and at least 96-hour hospital stays for 
cesarean deliveries.  If the physician, in consultation with the mother, discharges the 
patient before these time limits, the law requires that insurers provide coverage for a 
home or office follow-up visit for these women.  A similar federal law called the 
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996 went into effect on January1, 
1998.   
We use a restricted-use data set of all births in California over a six-year 
period to examine the effect of these early discharge laws.  Our sample has a total of 
2.4 million births over this period, reducing the problems of Type II errors present in 
some previous studies.  Using an interrupted time series design, we demonstrate that 
early discharge laws reduced considerably the fraction of newborns and mothers who 
were discharged early.  In two-stage least squares models, we used these laws as 
exogenous changes in the length of postpartum stays as instruments for the length of 
stay.  In these models we find that an additional day in the hospital reduced the 




complications and c-sections of all types.  The former result is statistically significant 
at conventional levels but the latter result is only significant at a p-value of around 
0.10.  We find there was no statistically significant change in 28-day newborn 
readmission rates for babies whose mothers had uncomplicated vaginal deliveries.  
Finally, although the statutes did not cover Medicaid patients and patients with no 
insurance, we find that their postpartum length of stay was affected by the law 
changes as well.  This is primarily driven by a unique feature of the California 
Medicaid system that many in Medicaid managed care plans received coverage from 
private plans that were subject to the law. 
 
1.2 Hospital Unionization  
 Patient outcomes are also affected by the organizational characteristics of 
hospitals, such as nursing staffing ratio, and skill mix of nurses, the profit structure of 
the hospital, etc.  Blegen et al. (1998) found that the higher the registered nurse skill 
mix, the lower the incidence of adverse occurrences on inpatient care units.  Aiken et 
al. (2002) found higher adverse events such as death within 30 days of admission and 
failure to rescue in hospitals with lower nurse staffing levels.  A review of the 
literature by Lang et al. (2004) concluded that although the literature offers no 
support for specific minimum nurse-patient ratios for acute care hospitals, total 
nursing hours and skill mix do appear to affect some important patient outcomes. 
 Over the past 40 years, the health care sector has experienced rising healthcare 
costs, growing government involvement in health care through the Medicare and 




technological advancement.  Given these complicated changes to the health care 
delivery system, nursing personnel indicated the desire for a greater voice in hospital 
organization and operations.  From the 1970s to the 1990s, in contrast to the 
widespread decline in unionization in the economy as a whole, hospitals experienced 
a rapid increase in unionization. With collective bargaining, unions negotiate with 
hospitals not only on wage and benefits, but also on minimum staffing levels, 
overtime hours and employment of nursing personnel such as, the ratio of registered 
nurses (RNs) to Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) and aides.  Needleman et al. 
(2002) found that the outcomes of patients are likely impacted by both the quantity 
and quality of nursing care.  Subsequently, it is very important to examine the effect 
of unionization on wage and employment of nursing personnel. 
 There have been few studies that have examined how unionization affects the 
employment of nursing personnel, and to validate the benefits or hindrances of 
unionization on nursing personnel and patients.  Most of the studies have been cross-
sectional in natures that have treated union status as exogenous.  Therefore, if unions 
are more likely to appear in hospitals with particular characteristics (e.g., hospitals 
with already higher wages) then these cross-sectional models will provide 
inconsistent estimates of the impact of unions.  As we demonstrate below, hospitals 
experiencing a union certification election and those covered by collective bargaining 
are very different from other hospitals. 
With a hospital-level panel dataset merged with unionization information, we 
use a basic difference-in-difference model to examine the impact of unions on 




employees.  The model identifies the impact of new union activity on the labor 
outcomes for the hospital using hospitals that do not change union status as a control.  
After unionization, we find greater utilization of aides who are lower-skilled nursing 
personnel compared to RNs and LPNs and large increase in the use of contract 
nursing personnel, who are not usually union members, relative to regular nursing 
personnel after hospital employees lost unionization elections.  The staffing ratio of 
nursing personnel per discharge or per bed days were not statistically significantly 
affected by unionization.   
In contrast to the vast literature on unionization in many other sectors of the 
economy, we find that the average hourly earnings of different nursing personnel 
decreased after hospital unionized.  This result could be caused by less usage of 
expensive overtime hours after hospital won the unionization elections.   
We also examine the impact of unions on wages using individual-level data 
from the Out-going rotation samples of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  We 
find small positive effects of unions on wages and little if any impact on hours of 
work.  These results are very similar to single-equation estimates that treat union 
status as exogenous.  These results suggest that nurses are not selected into unions 
based on their earnings potential, but, unions are more likely to appear in hospitals 




Chapter 2: Postpartum Hospital Stay and the Outcomes of 
Mothers and their Newborns 
 
2.1 Overview 
Between 1970 and 1992, the average postpartum length of stay for mothers 
who delivered vaginally declined by 46 percent, from 3.9 to 2.1 days.  Over the same 
period, the length of stay for those delivering by cesarean section fell from 7.8 to 4.0 
days, a drop of 49 percent (Thilo et al. 1998; Hyman 1999).  As a result of these 
trends, health professionals and policy makers expressed concern that shorter hospital 
stays might jeopardize the health of both mothers and newborns.  A number of tragic 
stories about mothers and newborns discharged early who later developed life-
threatening but preventable conditions fueled the desire of legislatures to address this 
issue.  Between 1995 and 1998, 42 states passed laws requiring insurance carriers to 
provide minimum postpartum length of stays and a similar federal law called the 
Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996 went into effect on January 1, 
1998. 
A number of authors have demonstrated that these laws increased average 
postpartum hospital length of stay, decreased the fraction of mothers and newborns 
discharged 'early', and increased hospitalization costs.  There is however limited 
evidence about the impact of these laws on the health of the mothers and their 
newborns, and estimates from these studies provide conflicting results.   
In this chapter, we use a restricted-use data set of California births over the 




discharge laws.  The California Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Act of 1997 
(NMHA), which went into effect on August 26, 1997, mandated that insurance 
carriers provide coverage for at least 48 hour hospital stays for normal vaginal 
deliveries and at least 96 hour hospital stays for cesarean deliveries.  If the mother, in 
consultation with the physician, agreed to be discharged before the state minimum 
time limits, the law also required that insurers provide coverage for an early home or 
office follow-up visit for the new mother and her newborn.  The federal law is similar 
to the California statute but it does not require that insurance carriers provide 
coverage for follow-up visits.  Both the California and Federal laws explicitly 
excluded Medicaid births from coverage. 
Using an interrupted time series model, we find that the California and federal 
law generated substantial and abrupt drops in the early discharge rate for vaginal and 
cesarean deliveries for births insured by private carriers.  Although the law did not 
cover Medicaid patients, their lengths of stay were affected by the laws as well.  We 
find that the law had no statistically significant impact on the 28-day readmission 
rates for newborns from uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, but there were statistically 
precise drops in readmission rates for newborns with complicated vaginal deliveries 
and c-sections without complications.  There was no statistically significant change in 
28-day mortality rates for newborns in any sub sample.   
Because early discharge laws exogenously increased the postpartum length of 
stay, we use their passages as instrumental variables for length of stay in a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) model to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of length of 




in both c-section deliveries sub samples, we find that an additional postpartum day in 
the hospital reduces 28-day readmission rates by 1 percentage point.  The former 
result is statistically significant at conventional levels but the latter result is only 
significant at a p-value of around 0.10.  In most cases, 2SLS results are larger in 
absolute value than their ordinary least-squares counterparts, suggesting OLS 
estimates are biased due to positive selection:  those most likely to be readmitted are 
also those most likely to have longer stays.   
2.2 Declining Postpartum Length of Stay and Passage of Early 
Discharge Laws 
The trend towards shorter postpartum hospital stays outlined above was 
brought about by a number of factors including a shortage of hospital beds, cost 
containment efforts by managed care organizations, and an effort to ‘de-medicalize 
childbirth’ (Braverman et al. 1995, Eaton, 2000).  As an increasing number of new 
mothers were discharged prior to the medically recommended length of stay, the 
press took notice and increasingly used terms such as “drive through deliveries” or 
“drive by deliveries” to describe early discharges.1   
In the middle of the 1990s, the medical profession and a number of state and 
federal legislators began recognizing the potential problems of shorter postpartum 
hospital length of stay.  Tragic stories of mothers and newborns discharged early2 
                                                 
1According to Declercq (1999), “…a June 1991 article in the Philadelphia Inquirer was the first 
reference to early postpartum discharge and the phrase “drive through deliveries” first appeared in the 
headline in a February 14, 1994, editorial in the New York Times.” 
2 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) and the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (AAP) define “early discharge” as a postpartum stay of less than 48 hours for uncomplicated 
vaginal births and a stay of less than 96 hours for cesarean deliveries (American College of Obstetrics 




who later developed life-threatening but preventable conditions fueled the desire of 
legislatures to address this issue.  For legislatures, mandating a minimum postpartum 
hospital length of stay seemed to be a reasonable and direct solution at that time.  
Declercq (1999) notes “early discharge laws involved incremental changes to an 
existing policy, a simple solution to a problem whose health consequences are 
unclear….”  The first bill regulating early discharge was passed by the Maryland 
legislature in 1995.  By 1998, early discharge laws had been adopted by 42 states.  
The Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996 (NMHPA) was 
signed by President Clinton on September 26, 1996 and became effective on January 
1, 1998.  The federal law mandated insurance carriers provide coverage for at least 
48-hour hospital stays for vaginal deliveries and at least 96-hour hospital stays for 
cesarean deliveries.  A decision to discharge a patient before these time limits could 
be made by a physician only after consulting with the mother. 
The California Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Act of 1997 (NMHA), which 
was passed and went into effect on the same day, August 26, 1997, adopted similar 
mandatory minimum stays as the NMHPA.  The California law did however require 
that if the physician, in consultation with the mother, discharged the patient before 
these time limits, insurers must provide coverage for an early home or office follow-
up visit for both the newborn and mother.  Both the federal and California statutes 
specifically exempted Medicaid patients from coverage.3   
                                                 
3 Declercq (1999) suggests that by exempting Medicaid, the laws required minimal public funds and 




2.3 Literature Review 
2.3.1 The Health and Medical Consequences of Short Postpartum Hospital 
Stays 
Research results vary widely regarding the consequences of an early 
postpartum discharge for the mother and newborn.  Most of the research on this topic 
correlates medical outcomes with the length of stay, controlling for observed 
characteristics of the patient and hospital.  Many of these studies have demonstrated 
that shorter hospital stays for newborns are associated with higher probabilities of 
hospital re-admissions (Lee et al., 1995; Liu et al., 1997; Malkin et al., 2000a), 
increased non-urgent visits to health centers and primary care providers (Madden et 
al., 2002; Mandl et al., 2000; Kotagal et al., 1999), increased the risk of jaundice (Liu 
et al., 1997; Grupp-Phelan et al., 1999) and increased neonatal mortality (Malkin et 
al., 2000).  The magnitudes of these effects are sometimes quite large.  Using 
Washington State linked birth certificate and hospital discharge abstracts covering 
310,578 live births from 1991 to 1994, Liu and Davis (1997) used logistic regressions 
to assess the impact of an early discharge (a discharge less than 30 hours after birth) 
on the risk of rehospitalization within one month of birth.  They found that newborns 
discharged early had a 28 percent higher 7-day re-admission rate and a 12 percent 
higher 28-day rate.  Using linked birth and death certificates, plus hospital discharge 
records for 48,000 births from Washington state in 1989 and 1990, Malkin et al., 
(2000b) found that neonatal mortality rates (death within 28 days) were 265 percent 




In contrast to these findings, Dalby et al. (1996), Kotagul and Tsang (1996), 
Brumfield et al. (1996), Cooper et al., (1996), Gagnon et al. (1997), Bragg et al. 
(1997), Mandl et al. (1997), Kotagal et al. (1999), Danielsen et al., (2000), Johnson et 
al. (2002), and Madden et al. (2002), all show little or no relationship between 
postpartum hospital stays and hospital re-admission rates.  Beebe et al. (1996) found 
no relationship between postpartum length of stay and neonatal mortality.  Finally, 
Mandl et al. (2000) and Madden et al. (2002) found no impact of early discharges on 
emergency room or urgent care visits while Bossert et al. (2001) and Madden et al. 
(2004) found no link between early discharge and treatment for jaundice.  Although 
many of these studies have smaller samples than the Liu and Davis (1997) paper cited 
above, not all of the results are simply Type II errors.  Using Ohio Medicaid Claims 
data linked to vital statistics files for 102,678 full-term births from July 1, 1991 to 
June 15, 1995, Kotagal et al. (1999) found that the fraction of newborns discharged 
early increased 185 percent over the period (from 21 to almost 60 percent).  However, 
there was no corresponding increase in the re-hospitalization rates in the same period.  
In a sample of 1.2 million vaginally-delivered newborns in California over the 1992-
1995 period, Danielson et al. (2000) found no statistically significant difference in 
28-day hospital readmission rates for babies released after a one-night stay compared 
to those with two or more nights stay. 
It may be no surprise that the results of the single-equation models vary 
considerably from study to study.  Infants assigned longer postpartum hospital stays 
are not a random selection of newborns but rather, tend to be children with more 




is positive selection on unobserved variables as well, then the expected negative 
relationship between length of stay and hospital readmission rates should be biased 
towards zero.  Positive selection bias on observed characteristics is easy to establish 
in our data set.  As we outline below, the data for this project includes all hospital 
discharges for childbirth in California over the 1995-2000 period.  Using data from 
the pre-California law period (1995 and 1996), in a simple OLS model, we regress 
postpartum length of stay (LOS) on observed characteristics.  Likewise, we estimate a 
logistic model with the same covariates but use as the dependent variable a dummy 
indicating whether the newborn was readmitted within 28 days.  We estimate these 
models for all vaginal and c-section births covered by private insurance and Medicaid 
and results for these models are reported in Table 2-1.  We report coefficients from 
the length of stay regression and marginal effects from the 28-day readmission logit 
regression.   
The results from these models indicate that for both vaginal and c-section 
deliveries, there is positive selection, that is, children we expect to have longer 
hospital stays tend to have observed characteristics that predict higher readmission 
rates.  Focusing on the results for vaginal deliveries, those with private insurance, 
those admitted to non-profit and for profit hospitals (compared to government-owned 
hospitals), children whose mothers had fewer complications during pregnancy and 
delivery, those with one or two previous births and girls, all have lower length of 
stays and lower odds of being readmitted to the hospital.  There is less of a consistent 
story about the selection bias for some of the demographic variables such as the 




shorter stays but the coefficient on marriage in the readmission logit is statistically 
insignificant.  Likewise, the coefficients on white and black children are of opposite 
signs in the two models.    
 
2.3.2 Analyses of Early Discharge Laws 
Udom and Betley (1998), Dato et al. (1996), and Liu et al. (2004) examined 
the impact of early discharge laws on the postpartum length of stay and costs.  All 
three studies show the laws increased the postpartum length of stay and increased 
costs, while the final two studies demonstrate the laws increased length of stays for 
those not impacted by the law such as Medicaid recipients and the self-insured.   
Madden et al. (2004) examined the effects of two policies affecting length of 
stay of mothers and newborns in Massachusetts: An HMO protocol adopted in 1994 
requiring a one-night hospital stay plus a nurse home visit after a vaginal delivery, 
and a 1996 Massachusetts early discharge law that was similar in scope to the 1998 
federal statute.  The authors used data on 20,366 mother-newborn pairs with normal 
vaginal deliveries between October 1990 and March 1998.  They found that the 
reduced length of stay in this HMO and the increase in stay generated by the state law 
had little impact on subsequent medical encounters for jaundice or newborn feeding 
problems.4  
In one of the most detailed studies to date, Meara et al. (2004) examined the 
impact of the Ohio early discharge law on the health of newborns in Medicaid.  
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Unlike the California and federal statutes, the Ohio law covered Medicaid patients.  
Using Medicaid claims over the 1991 through 1998 period, the authors establish that 
the law decreased considerably the fraction of short postpartum stays but they showed 
a noticeable but not statistically significant drop in hospital readmission rates.  The 
most innovative portion of this study was an examination of the efficacy of early 
post-discharge office visits.  Using the fact that there is variation in the delay of an 
office follow-up visit generated by the day of the week the birth occurred, the authors 
find that a follow-up visit that occurred within three days of discharge generated 
statistically significant reductions in hospital re-admission probabilities.  
Despite the large volume of research, there is still no consensus regarding the 
impact of short hospital stays on mothers and their newborns.  A review of the 
literature by Britton et al. (1994) concludes that “heterogeneity and limitations of 
methodology and study design substantially limit conclusions that may be drawn 
from published studies (p. 291).”  Braverman et al. (1995) concludes that “there is no 
clear evidence for the safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of the hospital and post-
hospital practices that were previously standard.  The current available literature 
provides little scientific evidence to guide discharge planning for most apparently 
well newborns and their mothers (p. 724)”.  A third review by Grullon and Grimes 
(1997) concludes that “The safety of early discharge is unclear (p. 860)” and “the 
current data do not support or condemn widespread use of early postpartum discharge 
in the general population (p. 860).”   
There are three persistent problems noted by the authors of the literature 




detect effects on outcomes that are rare in the population.  Second, many of these 
studies lacked detailed control variables, especially measures of pregnancy 
complications.  And third, few studies had experimental variation in the covariate of 
interest (postpartum length of stay).  Our work addresses all three of these 
shortcomings.   
Although there have been numerous studies on the impacts of short 
postpartum hospital stays, much of the literature has one or more of the shortcomings 
listed above.  Studies such as Marbella et al. (1998) have large samples but limited 
controls and no quasi-experimental variation.  Studies such as Malkin et al. (2000), 
Danielson et al. (2000), Kotagal et al. (1999), and Liu and Davis (1997), have large 
samples, excellent control variables, but no quasi experimental variation in 
postpartum length of stay.  Studies such as Meara et al. (2004), Madden et al. (2002) 
or Madden et al. (2004) have quasi-experimental variation and excellent control 
variables but samples that may be too small to make meaningful predictions about 
rare events like hospital re-admissions and neonatal mortality.   
Our study deals with the three major concerns listed above.  First, the law 
change occurred in California, a state with a large population, and we utilize data for 
approximately 3 million births in total, with more than half of these births occurring 
in the treatment period.  Our study will therefore be the largest sample ever used to 
analyze the impact of postpartum length of stay on health outcomes.  Second, 
although random assignment clinical trials are the gold-standard for inferring causal 
relationships, the number of observations necessary to eliminate a high Type II error 




questions.  The best that one can hope to obtain is quasi-experimental variation in 
field data that mimics a clinical trial.  As we demonstrate below, the California law 
change generated a large and immediate decline in the fraction of newborns and 
mothers discharged early provides just such variance.  Third, in contrast to some 
previous studies, we examine the impact of early discharge for infants whose mothers 
experienced complications either during pregnancy or labor. 
 The most recent paper studying the effect of early discharge law is Datar and 
Sood (2006).  They used the public-use version of the data set we use: linked 
California hospital discharge data for the years 1991 – 2000.  They also estimate an 
interrupted time series design to examine the effect of federal early discharge law on 
three outcomes, hours in the hospital, 28 day readmission rate and 1 year mortality 
rate of newborns.  They pooled all births together into one model: vaginal and 
cesarean births, private insured, Medicaid insured and uninsured births, and 
uncomplicated and complicated births.  Using data for year 1995 – 2000 for 28 day 
readmission regressions, they found a large impact of the Federal law on 28 days 
readmission rates.  In the first three years the law was in effect, the authors estimated 
the log odds of the 28-day readmission rate fell by 10, 20 and 30 percent respectively.  
Since the probability of a readmission is so close to 0, the percent change in the 
probability of a readmission is roughly the same magnitude.  Although they use 
similar samples and a similar econometric model, their results are different from ours. 
We have investigated in detail why the results differ and in Appendix A, we 




2.4 Constructing the Analytic File 
2.4.1 Data 
The data set for this analysis is a specially linked administrative record data 
sets of all mothers and newborns discharged from non-federal hospitals in California 
from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2000.  The data set is generated and 
maintained by the State of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD) and created by linking patient discharge data sets with birth, 
death and fetal death certificate information. 
Public-use versions of the patient discharge dataset contain demographic 
information such as the age, race, and sex of the mothers and newborns, information 
about the admission such as the length of stay, procedures used, diagnoses codes, the 
hospital charges, the type of insurance, and whether the patient died in the hospital.  
These discharge data sets also contain a code that identifies the hospital.   
The linked patient discharge dataset with vital statistics birth file is a 
restricted-use version of the discharge data that contains all the information in the 
public use discharge record, plus the exact date and time of birth (and therefore the 
newborn's admission to the hospital), the zip code of residence, a scrambled Social 
Security number, information from the birth file that identifies when and where a 
baby was born and information from the death file that identifies when and where a 
newborn died for up to one year after discharged.  The scrambled Social Security 
number can be used to link the discharge record over time so as to construct re-
admission rates for both mothers and newborns.  We have the ability to measure re-




death files will allow us to identify whether a newborn died within a fixed time period 
after admission and discharge, not just whether they died in the hospital.  Also, the 
developers of the data file have matched mothers to newborns allowing us to use 
characteristics of both mother and the newborn as covariates in multivariate 
regressions.  During the six years in our data set, there are approximately 3 million 
births in total, with 1.68 million births occurring after the passage of the California 
law. 
Although the early discharge laws impact the length of stay for both mothers 
and their newborns, in this analysis, we focus primarily on the outcomes of infants.  
We do this because adverse outcomes like readmission and mortality rates are higher 
for infants than mothers and as we demonstrate below, samples are in most cases just 
large enough to produce statistical significance with these larger adverse outcome 
rates. 
 
2.4.2 Outcome Variables 
There are several outcome variables that we can utilize in the linked Hospital 
Discharge Data/Vital Statistics birth files that directly or indirectly measure the health 
of mothers and their newborns.  The two most obvious outcomes are: the postpartum 
hospital length of stay and whether the mother and newborn were discharged early 
from the hospital.  These variables can be used to directly measure the impact of the 
California law and federal law.   
The hospital discharge data set measures length of hospital stay in days.  




length of stay in hours, our data set does not have the hour of discharge and therefore, 
we cannot calculate this value.  The intent of the law was to provide mothers with the 
ability to stay an extra night in the hospital if they desired.  Subsequently, the key 
outcome in our analysis is whether the infant was discharged early which is less than 
two nights for vaginal deliveries and less than four nights for c-sections.   
As we noted in the literature review, one concern with early discharges is that 
health care providers may not have had sufficient time to detect certain conditions.  
We will exploit the linked nature of our data and construct a measure of whether the 
newborns were re-admitted to the hospital within a specified time period.  In the 
Hospital Discharge Data/Vital Statistics birth files, the scrambled Social Security 
number can be used to link the discharge records of newborns over time.  Researchers 
typically measure re-admissions within 7, 14 and 28-days of birth, and we will follow 
this convention.  We will measure the re-admission rates with a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a person is re-admitted within a particular number of days.   
We will also use neonatal mortality rates as an outcome.  In the linked data 
set, death records for the newborn have been linked to the discharge and birth record.  
For each newborn, we know whether they died within one year of birth, plus the 
cause and place of death.  Following previous literature, we will use 28-day mortality 
rates for newborns.   
The final outcome measure we will examine is total charges for both the 
mother and infant's hospitalization.4F5  This variable is closely connected with 
postpartum hospital length of stay of mothers and newborns and the results will allow 
us to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the early discharge law.  In regression models, 
                                                 




given the skewness of hospital charges, we will examine models where the dependent 
variable is measured in natural logs.5F6   
 
2.4.3 Analysis Samples 
Many previous analyses of the impact of early discharge on the health of 
newborns have restricted their attention to uncomplicated vaginal and c-section 
deliveries.  The authors surmise that few complicated deliveries will be discharged 
early so they focus on the deliveries most likely impacted by laws such as the federal 
statute.  However, as we demonstrate below, we found that these laws significantly 
impacted the length of stay for complicated deliveries as well.  Therefore, we work 
with four distinct sub samples:  complicated and uncomplicated vaginal and c-section 
deliveries.  There are a variety of ways to define complicated deliveries.  One popular 
way is to use a specific DRG code for uncomplicated deliveries and there are codes 
for both mothers and newborns.6F7  In our data set, we also have data from the birth 
record that can be used to define a complicated pregnancy/delivery as any one where 
the mother presented any one of 24 complications during pregnancy7F8 or 23 
complications during labor.8F9  Although many patients whose DRG codes indicating a 
complicated delivery were also identified complications on the birth record, the 
overlap was not perfect.  Subsequently, we use both DRG code and detailed 
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complication information from birth record to define complicated or uncomplicated 
birth.  A birth is defined as uncomplicated if neither the DRG code nor the birth 
record identifies a complication.   
We use ICD-9 procedure codes and data on the birth record to identify 
whether the mother delivered vaginally or by c-section.  We restrict our attention to 
births covered by Medicaid or private insurance carriers, which captures about 95 
percent of all births in the state over the period of analysis.  Table 2-2 reports basic 
demographic information of mothers in our four samples, vaginal and c-section 
deliveries with and without complications.  On average, based on our samples, 
women who had a cesarean delivery were older, more educated, and more likely to be 
black than women who had a vaginal delivery. 
 Table 2-3 reports distribution of postpartum length of stay of newborns in July 
1995 through August 1997 period when federal law and California law has not been 
taken into effect.  For uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, 76.17 percent women stayed 
only one day in hospital after giving birth and this number was 62.12 percent for 
women who had complicated vaginal deliveries.  For cesarean deliveries, 86.74 
percent women stayed two or three days in hospital after having uncomplicated 
cesarean deliveries and it was 74.98 percent for women who had complicated 
cesarean deliveries.  So before the early discharge laws, most women stayed less than 






2.5 Graphical Analysis of California Law and Federal Law 
2.5.1 The Change in Postpartum Length of Stay 
In Figure 2-1, we plot the monthly fraction of newborns delivered vaginally 
without complications who were released early in each month.  The first vertical line 
in September of 1997 indicates the first full month the California law was in effect 
and the second line at January 1998 indicates when the federal law became effective.  
Note that in Figure 2-1, there was a substantial and abrupt change in the private 
insurance time series during a short period between September 1997 and January of 
1998.  Before September of 1997, the fraction of newborns with private insurance 
that had a length of stay less than 2 days was relatively stable with a small drift 
downward.  In August of 1997, 82 percent of newborns whose deliveries were paid 
for by private insurance had a postpartum length of stay less than 2 days.  By 
February of the next year, just six months later, this number had fallen to 50 percent, 
a 32 percentage point decline and a 39 percent reduction.  Early on in our sample, 
most insurance carriers knew the federal law would take effect in 1998, but from 
Figures 2-1, it appears that few were adjusting 6 months prior to the law change.  
Therefore, the state law change caught insurance carriers by surprise and as a result, it 
took some time to adjust.  Most carriers had a long lead time to prepare for the federal 
law and it appears from Figure 2-1 (and subsequent figures), that the adjustments to a 
longer length of stay occurred by the 1st quarter of 1998. 
Notice also in Figure 2-1 that although neither the California nor the federal 
law covered births paid by Medicaid, there was a sudden and persistent drop in the 




was less dramatic, but the post-law rates for both insurance types converged rapidly 
after the law was passed.  In chapter 3, we examine in detail why there was a decline 
in the fraction of short postpartum stays in Medicaid and much of the decline appears 
to be due to the specific type of Medicaid managed care plans in California.  
In Figure 2-2 we graph the early discharge rate for newborns who were 
delivered via uncomplicated cesarean section.  In this figure, an early discharge is 
defined as a postpartum length of stay that was less than four days.  Notice that 
starting in September of 1997 for those covered by private insurance, there was a 
noticeable drop in the fraction of early discharges.  In August of 1997, 90 percent of 
newborns delivered by cesarean section were discharged in less than 4 days.  By the 
middle of 1999, this number had fallen anywhere from 14 to 16 percentage points.  
For cesarean deliveries, although the drop was much less dramatic, we do see a drop 
in the fraction of Medicaid births discharged early.  
Figures 2-3 and 2-4 plot the early discharge rate for newborns after 
complicated vaginal and c-section deliveries, respectively.  From Figure 2-3, we can 
see that before the laws, on average there were 67 percent mothers and newborns that 
were discharged early even for vaginal deliveries with complications.  As was true for 
deliveries without complications, there was a substantial and abrupt drop in the early 
discharge rate in both September 1997 and January 1998 that are roughly the same 
size as the drops for uncomplicated deliveries.  Complicated vaginal deliveries 
covered by Medicaid showed a similar but less dramatic drop in January 1998.  In 




percentage point drop in the early discharge rate between August 1997 and February 
1998. 
These figures highlight a number of important facts.  First, if a short 
postpartum stay does affect some outcomes such as hospital re-admissions, then the 
sharp and dramatic drop in short stays generated by the California law should provide 
an excellent opportunity to precisely estimate the magnitude of this effect.  Second, 
deliveries covered by Medicaid were affected by the early discharge laws as well, 
eliminating this group as a potential control.  Third, the timing of the change in time 
trends corresponded exactly with the effective dates of the state and federal law.  
Fourth, the federal law reduced early discharge rates for complicated deliveries by the 
same rate as for uncomplicated deliveries, even though the former group has 
substantially lower early discharge rates prior to passage of the federal law.  
 
2.5.2 Change in Delivery Method 
We want to use the large change in postpartum hospital stays after the passage 
of the California and Federal laws to examine the link between length of stays and 
hospital re-admission rates. As we noted above, we will perform separate analyses for 
women with different insurance types, deliveries and the presence of complications.  
This analysis will only be accurate if the law did not change the distribution of births 
across these categories.  For example, if hospitals responded to the greater length by 
reducing c-section rates or defining fewer mothers as having complications, then the 




insurance status, c-section rates and the fraction of complications change when the 
California and Federal laws come into effect. 
In Figure 2-5, we graph the percent of complicated deliveries for private 
insurance and Medicaid.  From Figure 2-5, there were no noticeable changes in the 
percent of complicated after January 1998 when the federal law became effective.  
We do however see an increase in the fraction of births with complicated deliveries in 
the September 1997 to December 1997 which was when the California law first 
became effective.  We will return to this point in a future section but our analyses 
suggest that this was primarily due to a heavy flu season during this period.   
In Figure 2-6, we plot the fraction of deliveries that were by c-section for both 
private insurance and Medicaid coverage.  For both types of coverage, there was a 
slow upward movement in the fraction c-sections, but in general, there was no abrupt 
change in either September of 1996 or in January of 1998. 
Finally, Figure 2-7 plots the percent of births covered by insurance over time.  
The law will increase the costs of deliveries, possibly increasing the costs of 
insurance and as a result, possibly pricing some new mothers out of health insurance 
or encouraging them to move to Medicaid.  On average 97.5 percent of deliveries 
were covered by insurance in the long run and this ratio was very constant.  There 
were no significant changes before and after early discharge laws became effective.   
Based on the results from Figure 2-5 through 2-7, early discharge laws did not 
affect the percent of births recorded as complicated, the percent of cesarean deliveries 





2.5.3 Changes in Health Outcomes 
In the next four figures, we plot the 28-day readmission rate of newborns for 
vaginal and c-section deliveries without complications (Figures 2-8 and 2-9), and the 
same deliveries with complications (Figures 2-10 and 2-11).  In each of these figures, 
the month-to-month variation in 28-day readmission rate dwarfs any systematic 
change in readmission rates produced by the law, so it is difficult in these graphs to 
tell whether the law improved birth outcomes.  There was however a noticeable 
increase in readmission rates in December of 1997, the fourth full month that the 
California law was in effect and the last month before the federal law took effect.  
One may be tempted to attribute this sharp increase in readmissions to the California 
law.  But a closer inspection of the data suggests that something else was occurring.  
Notice that readmission rates always spike in the late autumn and early winter months 
during the flu season.  The winter of 1997/98 was a particularly heavy flu season in 
California as was pointed out in a report released by OSHPD.9F10  Flu complications 
are a common reason for readmission among infants.   
The cyclic nature on newborn readmissions suggests that we must control for 
day-to-day environmental conditions that may alter readmission rates.  For infants 
born on a particular day, we calculate the 28-day admission rate (defined as 
admissions per number of children) for those born 90 to 180 days ago.  We allow this 
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readmission rate to vary by type of insurance.  Our use of children 90-180 days old 
does however mean that we lose the first six months of data in our analysis. 10F11 
In Figures 2-12 and 2-13, we average the 28-day readmission rate of 
newborns and older infants up to the month level and plot the series over time for 
vaginal deliveries under private insurance and Medicaid.  These Figures show that the 
admission rates of slightly older infants is highly correlated with the 28 day 
readmission rate of newborns and both indexes demonstrates a sharp rise in 
admissions in December of 1997.  We will use the admission index for older infants 
as a control variable in our model to capture the day to day variation in unobserved 
conditions that lead to changes in readmission rates.   
 
2.6 Econometric Model 
2.6.1 A Reduced-Form Model 
To estimate the impact of the law on birth outcomes, we would ideally use a 
difference-in-difference model, where we could compare the average length of stay of 
mothers and newborns before and after the California early discharge law went into 
effect, using a comparison group to identify what the time path of outcomes would 
have been in the absence of the intervention.  Unfortunately for our research 
purposes, all states were treated in roughly the same time period by the Federal law.  
Likewise, the preliminary data above suggest that within California, the law impacted 
those not covered by the statute.  Given the lack of any control group, we therefore 
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use an interrupted time series model instead. This technique requires the modeling of 
a process underlying a time series of data and is used as a means of assessing the 
impact of a discrete intervention on a social process.   
Interrupted time series models are sometimes difficult to implement for a 
variety of reasons.  First, it is often difficult to measure precisely when an 
intervention became effective.  Second, other events may contaminate the treatment 
effect.  For this particular study, we are fortunate that the timing of the law change is 
exact, and the immediate and large impact of the law makes it difficult to argue that 
some other event explains the sudden and precipitous change in hospital length of 
stays for newborns.   
The unit of analysis for this study will be a mother/newborn pair, and the key 
patient of interest is the newborn because prior studies have suggested their health is 
more likely to be affected by an early discharge.  In the newborn models, we label the 
outcome variable of interest Y.  Outcomes vary across patients, hospitals and time, 
which are indexed by i, k and t, respectively.  The basic interrupted time series model 
is of the form 
 
(1) Yikt =  NEWBORNiktβ1 + PARENTS iktβ2 + HOSPiktβ3 + 
STATELAWt*PAYERiα1 + FEDLAWt*PAYERi α2 + 
HSAREAk*HOSP_SIZEk*PAYERi*MTRENDtβ4 + 
HSAREAk*HOSP_SIZEk*PAYERi β5 + INDEX90180tβ6  +  MONTHt + 





NEWBORN and PARENTS are vectors of control variables that describe 
characteristics of the newborn (sex, race, ethnicity, the hour of birth), and the mother 
and father (such as age, education, and the number of previous births) plus insurance 
status (PAYER).  To control for seasonal patterns in re-admission rates, we include a 
set of twelve monthly fixed-effects, labeled as MONTH.  There are also persistent 
differences in outcomes across hospitals with particular characteristics and we capture 
these with the vector HOSP. In this vector, we include dummy variables for hospital 
size (HOSP_SIZE),11F12 ownership status 12F13, hospital service area (HSAREA) 13F14.  There 
may be variation within the week in some outcomes based on the day of admission, 
so we include a set of day of the week fixed-effects, labeled as DAYt.  Finally, to 
control for day-to-day conditions that may generate readmissions, we include the 
admission rate for infants 90 to 180 days of age.  For an infant born on day t, we use 
as an index the number of admissions per child over the next 28 days for all children 
aged 90-180 days who were alive on that birth date. The variable εikt is an additive 
error. 
 Because we do not have a natural control group that was unaffected by the law 
changes, we must capture the time series in postpartum length that would have 
occurred in the absence of the California with time trends.  We are aided by the fact 
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that the pre-law and post-law trends are very similar as Figures 1-4 demonstrate.  
Taking the aggregate data for Figure 1 and regressing the fraction of early discharges 
in private insurance on a time trend, dummies for the state and federal law, plus a 
time trend for the four months of the state law, we obtain an R2 of 0.98. To eliminate 
any secular trend in the data, we include a monthly trend MTRENDt that equals 1 if 
the birthday of newborn is in January of 1995, 2 in February, etc. We allow the 
monthly trend to vary by the health service area, hospital size, and the source of 
payment of delivery.  
The key variables in the model are the vectors α1 and α2 that measure the 
impact of the state and federal respectively.  The variable STATELAW equals 1 from 
August 27, 1997 through December 31, 1997, while FEDLAW equals 1 from January 
1, 1998 and on.  In each regression, we allow the effects of the law to vary across 
patients with private insurance and Medicaid.   
There are two continuous outcomes (length of stay in days and dollars of total 
charges) and three sets of outcomes that are dichotomous (early discharge, re-
admission and neonatal mortality).  For models with continuous outcomes, we will 
estimate ordinary least squares, and for discrete models, we will estimate logistic 
regression models.14F15  In all models except quantile regression estimates below, we 
control for possible autocorrelation in errors by allowing for arbitrary correlation in 
errors within a hospital over time.   
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We titled this section 'a reduced-form model' for a particular reason.  The 
California law changed two things at once.  First, it required insurance carriers to 
provide coverage for longer postpartum hospital stays.  Second, it required insurance 
carriers to provide coverage for a follow-up visit for mothers who, after consulting 
with their physician, were discharged from the hospitals early.  Therefore, the 
estimated impact of the law contained in coefficients (α1 and α2) captures both of 
these changes.  This distinction is potentially important.  Suppose that a) early 
discharge increases the chance of a hospital readmission, b) early follow-ups of 
patients released early eliminate this risk, and c) everyone released early has a follow-
up visit.  In this case, the coefficients on α1 and α2 will both be zero since the harm 
from an early discharge was compensated for by the office follow-up visit.  Previous 
research from California has demonstrated, however, that this is probably not a 
concern.15F16  Although in principal α1 and α2 capture both effects, any impact we 
estimate is likely to be driven primarily by the change in length of stay and not an 
increase in early follow-up visits.   
 
2.6.2 Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimate 
We argued in the previous section that the health benefits from the law are 
likely to be driven by longer postpartum length of stays and not the mandated 
coverage for early follow-up visits after an early discharge.  We quantify the size of 
the relationship between postpartum length of stay and adverse outcomes by using the 
information from the reduced-form models in a more structured way.  Specifically, 
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we use the adoptions of the federal and state laws as instrumental variables for length 
of stay in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to obtain consistent estimates of the 
impact of length of stay on medical outcomes. 
To more formally outline this model, note that one question of interest is the 
impact of length of stay on 28-day readmission rates. We can model this statistically 
with the following ‘structural’ equation of interest: 
 
(2) 28DAYikt = Xiktβ1 + LOSikt δ1 + ε1ikt 
 
Where for simplicity, we include all the covariates from equation (1) into one vector 
X.  The key covariate in this regression is LOS which measures postpartum length of 
stay of newborns in days.  As we noted above, equations such as (2) have been 
estimated by a number of authors but we suspect that cov(LOSikt, ε1ikt) >0 so OLS 
estimates of δ1 will be biased towards zero.   
Two-stage least squares estimation requires that a researcher identify a 
variable that exogenously changes the endogenous covariate of interest (LOS) but has 
no direct impact on health (28DAY). In this case, the instruments are the enforcement 
dates for the state and federal law.  As Figures 2-1 – 2-4 indicate, the federal law 
clearly changed hospital length of stay and for the reasons mentioned above it is 
plausible that this change was exogenous.  For this particular study, we are fortunate 
that the timing of the law change is exact, and the immediate and large impact of the 
law makes it difficult to argue that some other event was explaining the sudden and 




properly control for the secular trends in the outcome, the instruments should not 
generate any omitted variables bias in the outcome equation of interest.16F17   
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Reduced Form Model Regression Results 
Table 2-4 presents the results of equation (1) – the reduced-form model for 
infants using four sub samples, vaginal and cesarean deliveries without and with 
complications.  We initially report results for four outcomes: percent discharged 
early, length of stay in days, 28 days readmission, and log total inpatient charges 
(charges for the infants plus the mother).  We estimate all models as linear 
regressions although these two outcomes – discharged early and 28 day readmission – 
are dichotomous.   
For privately insured vaginal deliveries without complications, we find that 
the California and federal law reduced early discharge rates of newborns by 16 
percentage and 31 percentage points, respectively, with the later result being 38 
percent of the pre-law rates.  The standard errors on these estimates are incredibly 
small and the results are statistically significant at conventional levels.17F18  
Interestingly, the federal law had only a slightly smaller impact on vaginal deliveries 
with complications although the mean discharged early is 14 percentage points lower 
                                                 
17 Our key outcomes (re-admissions and neonatal mortality) are both discrete and the key covariate of 
interest (length of stay in days) is continuous.  A 2SLS model where we instrument for LOS will 
therefore not mimic the data generating process well.  This model could be estimated by maximum 
likelihood models where the outcome is discrete and the endogenous variable of interest is continuous 
(Evans, Oates and Schwab, 2002; Evans, Farrelly and Montgomery, 1998).  However, given the size of 
the data set and the number of covariates in the model, this model will be difficult to estimate.  Angrist 
(2001) has however demonstrated that two-stage least squares models applied to limited and discrete 
dependent variables replicate treatment effect parameters from more complicated maximum likelihood 
models. 




in this later group.  For c-section deliveries, the federal law is estimated to reduce 
early discharge rates by 12 and 14 percentage points respectively, privately insured c-
section deliveries with and without complications, respectively. In general, the effect 
of the state law is about half the impact of the federal law for those with private 
insurance.  Although neither law applies to Medicaid births, the federal law reduced 
early discharges of vaginal births by 12 percentage points in both samples, and again, 
both of these results are statistically significant at conventional levels, The state law is 
estimated to not have reduced early discharges for c-sections by a statistically 
significantly amount in either sample.   
In the next column of results, we report average change in length of stay 
measured in days and the results in this column parallel those for the discharged early 
outcome.  For vaginal deliveries covered by private insurance, the federal laws 
increased average length of stay by 0.36 days among uncomplicated deliveries and by 
0.44 days for those with complicated deliveries, and both estimates are statistically 
significant.  The corresponding numbers for the Medicaid population are 0.15 and 
0.21 days (both statistically significant), which are roughly 40 percent of the values of 
the federal law.  Among c-section deliveries covered by private insurance, the federal 
law increased average stays by a statistically significant 0.43 days for uncomplicated 
deliveries and 0.73 days for complicated deliveries, while the impact of the state law 
was half as large for uncomplicated deliveries and two-thirds as large for complicated 
c-sections.   
In the third set of results for each sub sample, we report results for the 28-day 




reductions in these rates after passage of the state and federal laws.  For vaginal 
deliveries without complications, we observe a statistically insignificant drop in 
readmissions rates of 0.06 percentage point after the passage of the federal law for 
privately insured and 0.03 percentage point for those covered by Medicaid.  In 
contrast, for the same subsample, we observe a statistically significant increase in 
readmissions after passage of the state law for both insurance types.  This could be 
attributed to the law but alternatively, this could be due to the fact we cannot control 
perfectly for the large spike in admissions that is observed in December of 1997 
during the severe flu season in California.  What do those results mean?  For 
complicated vaginal deliveries and both cesarean deliveries samples, totally there 
were 594,049 deliveries in January 1998 through December 2000 period.  For those 
observations, if we multiply the estimated parameters for federal law*Private 
Insurance and federal law*Medicaid to the corresponding number of observations in 
that sub sample and get the sum of the results, we could see for complicated vaginal 
deliveries and cesarean deliveries samples all together, the federal law reduced 28 
days readmission by 2,700 cases, that is, 2,700 readmissions of newborns were 
avoided due to the federal law. 
For vaginal deliveries with complications, we observe reductions in 
readmission rates after the state and federal law and for both insurance types, but the 
results are only statistically significant for Medicaid patients after the federal law.  
Among those with private insurance delivered by c-section, there was a statistically 




of the federal law, and the coefficient is statistically significant in the uncomplicated 
sample but the estimate in the complicated sample has a t-statistic of -1.42.   
In the final column of results for each subsample, we estimate a model of log 
charges which is the total charges paid for both the mother and her infant.  Among 
those with private insurance, the passage of the federal law is estimated to increase 
charges by eight to 10 percent for vaginal births, 4.7 percent for uncomplicated c-
section deliveries and 6.1 percent for complicated c-section deliveries.  The federal 
law increased Medicaid charges by 2 percent for vaginal deliveries and the state law 
increased payments for privately insured patients by a similar amount. 
Given the skewness in total charges, the least square regression results in 
Table 2-4 can be distorted by some large outliers in the charges distribution.  For the 
reduced form model having log total charge as dependent variable, we also estimate 
quantile regressions models at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the conditional 
distribution in log charges.  The quantile regression results are reported in Table  
2-5. 18F19  In general, because the law is impacting the lower tail of the length of stay 
distribution, we would expect larger reduced-form estimates on the treatment effect 
dummies for lower conditional quantiles and this is exactly what we find.  Looking at 
the results for those with private insurance among vaginal deliveries without 
complication, the federal law is estimated to increase costs by 9.6, 9 and 8 percent at 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively.  In all three cases, the parameter 
estimates are forty to fifty times larger than standard errors.  For uncomplicated c-
section deliveries paid by private insurance, the federal law increased costs by 5, 4 
and 2 percent across the three conditional quantiles.  Notice that mean estimates from 
                                                 




Table 2-4 for the federal law among the privately insured is slightly lower than the 
median estimates in Table 2-5 among vaginal deliveries, but this ordering is reversed 
for c-section deliveries.   
 Much of the literature in this area examines 28-day readmission rates as a key 
outcome but we can calculate 7 and 14 day readmission rates as well.  As we shorten 
the follow up after birth, the incidence rate falls considerably.  Linear probability 
models tend to generate marginal effects similar to estimates from logit models but 
only when the mean outcome is some distance from zero or one.  In the case, the 
small rate of 7 and 14 day readmissions necessitates that we estimate a logit model 
for these outcomes.   
 Table 2-6 reports the reduced-form logistic regression models where the 
outcomes of interest are initially the 7, 14, and 28 day readmission rate for infants and 
in the table, we report the ‘average treatment effect’ which is the estimated change in 
the logistic CDF when the law dummies are turned on and off.   The results in Table 
2-6 indicate the federal early discharge law had no statistically significant effect on 
readmission rates for either privately insured or Medicaid vaginal delivery patients.  
In contrast, the state law is estimated to generate statistically significant increases in 
readmission rates for these same patients.  As we explained before, this could be fact 
that we are not controlling completely for the day-to-day fluctuations in admission 
rates with our admission index. 
 Looking at the impacts of the federal law for privately insured vaginal 
deliveries with complications and c-sections without complications, we see a number 




equation is nearly identical to the linear probability estimates in Table 2-4.  Second, 
the coefficients for the 7, 14 and 28-day readmission rates are nearly identical 
meaning that for these samples, ALL of the problems generated by short hospital 
stays will manifest themselves within seven days.  However, in all three samples, 
especially for c-sections with complications, the coefficient on the (federal law x 
private insurance) variable increases monotonically as one move from the 7-day, 14-
day and 28-day equations.  In this final model, we generate a coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.   
 In the final column of each section of results, we also report logit estimates 
where the outcome of interest is the 28-day mortality rate for newborns.  Across the 
four samples, neonatal mortality is anywhere from 6 per 10,000 to 45 per 10,000 so 
this adverse outcome is very rare.  We see some evidence that for those experiencing 
the largest increase in length of stay (privately insured patients impacted by the 
federal law), there is a decline in mortality in two of four samples but none of the 
estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.   
 
2.7.2 2SLS Regression Results 
The reduced-form estimates presented in the previous three tables represent 
the ‘intention to treat’ impacts of the state and federal law.  In this section, we 
generate estimates of the impact of the law on those treated by calculating 2SLS 
estimates of equation (2).  As we noted above in Table 2-1, those most likely to have 
longer hospital stays are also those most likely to experience a 28-day readmission.  If 




readmission rates are correlated with length of stay in the same direction as these 
observed characteristics, then OLS estimates of equation (2) are biased towards zero. 
In the first third of Table 2-7, we report OLS estimates of equation (2) to form 
a baseline to which we can compare 2SLS results.  In this model, the 28-day 
readmission dummy variable is the outcome of interest and key covariate is length of 
stay measured in days.  The estimated impact of an additional day in the hospital is 
fairly uniform across the samples, ranging from a low of .12 percentage points for 
vaginal deliveries with complications to .22 percentage points for c-sections without 
complications.    
In the next third of the table, we report 2SLS estimates that use four 
instruments for postpartum length of stay: the federal and state laws interacted with 
Medicaid and private insurance.  In three of our four samples, the results are negative 
and the estimates are larger in absolute value, which is consistent with the selection 
bias story we outlined above.  In the vaginal delivery sample without complications, 
the 2SLS estimates suggest that an additional day in the hospital will reduce 28-day 
readmission rates by 0.09 percentage points, but by OLS, an additional day in the 
hospital will reduce 28-day readmission rate by 0.13 percentage point.  For this 
sample, the results are not consistent with our story that OLS estimates are biased 
towards zero.  This could be caused by the fact that we are using both state and 
federal law as instrumental variables, and there are significant positive effects of state 
law on readmission rates.  For vaginal deliveries without complications, the 0.764 p 




we can conclude is that even with 1.3 million observations, we do not have enough 
power to reject the null hypothesis that the length of stay coefficient is zero. 
In contrast, the coefficients on length of stay in the other three samples are all 
large and statistically precise at much lower p-values.  For vaginal deliveries with 
complications and both c-section samples, we estimate that an additional day of stay 
reduces 28-day readmission rates by about 1 percentage point.  These are large 
numbers.  In the vaginal delivery with complication sample and in the c-sections 
samples without and with complications, the ratio of the 2SLS estimate divided by the 
sample mean is 0.297, 0.20, and 0.119, respectively.  Across these same samples, 
these estimates are statistically different from zero at the p-values of 0.054, 0.093, 
and 0.158, respectively.   
The p-values on the test of over-identifying restrictions in the final three 
models are all comfortably in excess of 0.05 but the estimate for the uncomplicated 
vaginal delivery sample is very small.  This is to be expected given the reduced-form 
estimates in Table 2-4.  Given the imperfect controls for cyclic variation in 
readmission rates, we find in reduced-form models that the state law actually 
increased readmission rates.  Since the test of over-identifying restrictions can also be 
thought of as a test of the null hypothesis that the 2SLS estimates are identical 
regardless of the instrument set used, we would expect to reject the null with test 
since the federal instruments is predicting a positive benefit of an additional day of 
stay whereas the other instruments predict a negative effect. 
The problems with the four months when only the state laws were in effect is 




the sample and only use the federal law interacted with insurance coverage as 
instruments.  Now in all four samples, the estimates are negative and larger in 
absolute value, which is consistent with the selection bias story we outlined above.  In 
these models, the p-values on the 2SLS coefficients across the four samples are 0.647, 
0.05, 0.115 and 0.086, respectively.  Also, the p-values on the test of over-identifying 
restrictions are now all incredibly big with three in excess of 0.95.  For vaginal 
deliveries without complications, we still do not have enough power to reject the null 
hypothesis that the length of stay coefficient is zero. 
2.8 Why were Medicaid Deliveries Impacted by the Early Discharge 
Laws? 
 
The federal and California early discharge statutes specifically excluded 
Medicaid patients from coverage.  Declercq (1999) suggests that by exempting 
Medicaid covered deliveries, the laws required minimal public funds and assured 
quick passage of the statutes.  It is therefore somewhat surprising that although the 
law did not cover Medicaid patients, their lengths of stay were affected by the laws as 
well.  In this section, we attempt to explain why deliveries covered by Medicaid were 
also affected by the early discharge laws.  We do so by examining two possible 
explanations.  First, there are two types of Medicaid covered deliveries: deliveries 
covered by traditional Medicaid fee-for-service, and deliveries covered by Medicaid 
managed care.  For Medicaid fee-for-service deliveries, they were not covered by the 
early discharge laws, so they should not be affected by the laws.  Some Medicaid 




Enrollees in these managed care plans in many cases have the same type of insurance 
as a person enrolled in an employer-provided managed care plan, so those deliveries 
should be affected by the early discharge laws.  We pool Medicaid deliveries together 
and do not differentiate different types of Medicaid coverage in the regressions.  
Subsequently we get the results that Medicaid deliveries were affected.  Second, the 
drop in early discharge Medicaid might be caused by the behavior of physicians.  As 
we demonstrated above, prior to passage of the California early discharge law, the 
majority of private and Medicaid deliveries were discharged early.  After the passage 
of the law, it is clear that physicians responded quickly to the change in private 
insurance coverage.  Among Medicaid patients, the response was not nearly as large.  
It may be the case that in hospitals with a majority of private insurance deliveries, it 
was easier for physicians to treat the minority of Medicaid cases like their privately 
insured patients.   
2.8.1 Medicaid Managed Care in California 
Prior to 1994, few Medicaid recipients in the state of California were in any 
type of managed care plan.  As a result, most Medicaid deliveries were covered by 
traditional fee-for-service Medicaid where the state government directly reimbursed 
hospitals, physicians, pharmacies and other health care providers for the costs 
associated with the medical care they provided. 
In 1993, the director of the state’s Department of Health Services, in response 
to rising health care costs, devised a plan to increase the share of Medicaid patients on 
managed care plans.  The goal of the plan was to increase to 50 percent the fraction of 




Under this new initiative, enrollment in managed care plans would be done at 
the county level and each county would be part of one of three types of managed care 
structures:  a County Organized Health System (COHS), a two-plan model, or a 
geographic managed care model (GMC).  Under COHS, managed care plans are run 
by the county.  In the Two-Plan model, one of the options would be a county plan and 
the other would be a private insurance plan that has a contractual obligation to insure 
county residents in their plan.  In the GMC option, there is no county-provided 
managed care option and residents can only choose a privately contracted Medicaid 
managed care plan.   
Prior to 1993, two counties (Santa Barbara and San Mateo) had COHS options 
and under the new plan, three more counties would adopt this system (Orange, Santa 
Cruz and Solano).  A total of 13 counties would adopt the two-plan models and the 
remainder of the counties would be assigned the GMC type.  Based on Duggan 
(2004), the share of California Medicaid recipients enrolled in a managed care plan 
increased from 10% in 1991 to 51% in 1999. 
Medicaid deliveries are excluded from the coverage of early discharge law 
based on California Newborns’ and Mothers’ Health Act of 1997 (NMHA).  A memo 
from Department of Health Services on January 16, 1998 specifies the application of 
NMHA to the three models of Medicaid managed care.  Given the legislation that 
defined the charters for managed care plans, the memo concludes that Medicaid 
managed care plans are covered by NMHA if the managed care plan is a private plan.  
This includes Medicaid patients under the private insurance plan of Two-Plan model 




private plans to provide services to Medicaid patients.  The memo further concludes 
that county-run Medicaid managed care plans in the COHS and Two-Plan models are 
not covered unless a county-run Medicaid managed care plan contracts with private 
plans to provide care.   
The California State Inpatient dataset that we use identifies which deliveries 
are covered by Medicaid, but unfortunately, the data set did not start to report whether 
Medicaid deliveries were under the coverage of Medicaid fee-for-service or Medicaid 
managed care till year 1999.  So for the critical period between September 1997 and 
January of 1998 when the state law and federal law became effective, we do not have 
information about the specific Medicaid type of Medicaid deliveries.  More 
importantly, when we do have data on managed care enrollment in the 1999 and after 
period, we do not know in two-plan counties whether the patient was enrolled in the 
county-based or private managed care plan. 
We do not have individual level data about their specific type of Medicaid 
insurance, but we know the Medicaid insurance model of each county.  Based on this 
information, we might be able to test our hypothesis by checking effect of laws on 
counties with different types of Medicaid insurance.  Table 3B in Duggan (2004) and 
Table 1 in Aizer et al. (2004) list the start dates of different Medicaid Managed care 
models in different counties.  Based on these lists, counties could be classified as 
three types, counties covered by Medicaid fee-for-service plus counties with other 
Models of Medicaid coverage but percent of Medicaid Managed care counties less 
than 10 percent, counties covered by Medicaid COHS model and with higher than 10 




GMC models and with higher than 10 percent of Medicaid managed care coverage.  
Since we are studying the effect of early discharge laws on different types of 
Medicaid, we make sure the start date of Medicaid managed care plans are earlier 
than September 1997.  Also, our data reports whether Medicaid patients are under the 
coverage of Medicaid fee-for-service or Medicaid managed care from 1999, we check 
this information for different counties and conform that our Medicaid fee-for-service 
counties have no patients under the coverage of Medicaid managed care in year 1999.  
For the reduced model (1), we do separate regressions to deliveries in the 
three types of counties, Medicaid fee-for-service counties and counties with percent 
of Medicaid managed care less than 10 percent, Medicaid COHS counties (with 
higher than 10 percent of Medicaid managed care coverage), and Medicaid Two-Plan 
and GMC counties (with higher than 10 percent of Medicaid managed care coverage).   
 Table 2-8 presents regression results of model (1) using four sub samples but 
only for Medicaid fee-for-service counties, vaginal and cesarean deliveries without 
and with complications.  Results for two outcomes, percent discharged early, and 
length of stay in days are reported.  
 We are focusing on the effect of laws on Medicaid deliveries.  For Medicaid 
fee-for-service covered uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, we find that the California 
law reduced early discharge rates of newborns by 7.09 percentage points, and reduced 
early discharge rates of newborns by 6.44 percentage points for complicated vaginal 
deliveries.  The standard errors on these estimates are incredibly small and the results 
are statistically significant at conventional levels.  For state law, we find that the 




uncomplicated vaginal deliveries and 1.01 percentage points for complicated vaginal 
deliveries and both results are not statistically significant. 
 For cesarean deliveries, neither federal law nor state law had statistically 
significant effect on Medicaid fee-for-service deliveries.  The federal law and the 
state law even increased early discharge rate of both complicated and uncomplicated 
deliveries although the results are not statistically significant.   
In the next column of results, we report length of stay measured in days for 
Medicaid fee-for-service counties as an outcome variable and the results in this 
column parallel those for the discharged early outcome.  For Medicaid fee-for-service 
covered deliveries, on average the federal law increased length of stay by 0.08 days 
among uncomplicated vaginal deliveries and had no statistically significant effect on 
length of stay of complicated vaginal deliveries.  For Medicaid fee-for-service 
covered cesarean deliveries, neither federal law nor state law had a statistically 
significant effect on postpartum length of stay of newborns.  
So for Medicaid fee-for-service covered cesarean deliveries, the results are as 
our hypothesis, they were not covered by the early discharge laws, so the early 
discharge laws had no statistically significant effect on the postpartum length of stay 
of those newborns.  However, for Medicaid fee-for-service covered vaginal 
deliveries, they were affected by the law although the laws excluded them from 
coverage.  This could not be explained by our hypothesis. 
Table 2-9 reports regression results of model (1) for Medicaid COHS 
counties.  We are still focusing on effect of early discharge laws on Medicaid 




mandated time, the federal law reduced early discharge rates of newborns by 20 
percentage and 24 percentage points respectively for uncomplicated and complicated 
vaginal deliveries, and the impact of state law was half as large for both samples.  The 
federal law also had statistically significant effects on Medicaid COHS covered 
cesarean deliveries and reduced early discharge rate by 4.53 percentage and 10.26 
percentage points respectively for uncomplicated and complicated cesarean 
deliveries.  For results of the outcome variable – length of stay in days, for all 
samples the federal and state law increased length of stay in days by a statistically 
significant amount except that for uncomplicated cesarean deliveries, the state law 
had no statistically significant on length of stay of Medicaid deliveries.   
Although for Medicaid COHS model covered deliveries, we find the laws had 
statistically significant effect on their length of stay.  Our hypothesis that the reason 
Medicaid deliverers were affected is that Medicaid managed care covered deliveries 
were treated as privately insured deliveries could not be proved by the results, since if 
county-run Medicaid managed care plans in COHS model contracts with private 
plans to provide care, they would be covered by early discharge laws.  We do not 
have detailed information about how each Medicaid COHS model county contracts 
with private plans, so with contracted private plans covered by the law, we could not 
differentiate whether the effect of the laws on length of stay was due to the coverage 
of law on contracted private plan or due to that the possibility deliveries insured by 
Medicaid county-run plan were treated as privately insured deliveries although they 




Table 2-10 reports regression results of model (1) for Medicaid Two-Plan and 
GMC counties.  We are still focusing on effect of early discharge laws on Medicaid 
deliveries.  For results of outcome variable – whether length of stay is less than 
mandated time, the federal law reduced early discharge rates of newborns by 10 
percentage points for uncomplicated and complicated vaginal deliveries and reduced 
early discharge rate of newborns by 1 percentage points for complicated cesarean 
deliveries, while the federal law had no statistically significant effect on early 
discharge rate of uncomplicated cesarean deliveries.  For results of outcome variable 
– length of stay in days, for all samples the federal law increased length of stay in 
days by a statistically significant amount and the state law had no statistically 
significant on length of stay of Medicaid deliveries except for complicated cesarean 
deliveries.   
Since Medicaid managed care plans are covered by NMHA if they are private, 
and this includes Medicaid patients under the private insurance plan of Two-Plan 
model and all Medicaid patients under GMC model since the GMC model contracts 
with different private plans to provide services to Medicaid patients, although for 
Medicaid Two-Plan and GMC model covered deliveries, we find the laws had 
statistically significant effect on their length of stay.  The results we get are total 
effect of different plans, so as Medicaid COHS, our hypothesis that the only reason 
Medicaid deliveries were affected is that some Medicaid managed care plan were 
covered by the law still could not be proved.  Comparing results in Table 2-9 with 
Table 2-10, the early discharge laws had a bigger effect on Medicaid COHS covered 




have the proportion of different Medicaid managed care models in each county, we 
could not explain why the result happened. 
There is one thing to note about results in Table 2-9 and 2-10.  For Medicaid 
COHS counties, and Medicaid Two-plan and GMC counties, there were still high 
proportions of Medicaid fee-for-service deliveries since the transition from Medicaid 
fee-for-service to Medicaid managed care was a long process.  Based on results from 
regressions of model (1) on counties with different models of Medicaid deliveries, we 
could not fully prove our hypothesis.  To prove our hypothesis, we need to see effect 
of law only on samples with Medicaid managed care that they are covered by early 
discharge laws.  We could get a definite conclusion from our results that for Medicaid 
fee-for-service counties, Medicaid vaginal deliveries were affected by the law 
statistically significantly although they were not covered by the law.  This result 
could not be explained by our hypothesis.  We are trying to explain this by the 
hypothesis about behavior of physicians. 
2.8.2 Behavior of Physicians 
The early discharge laws only apply to privately insured deliveries.  The 
distributions of Medicaid deliveries are various across hospitals.  For hospitals with 
very low fraction of Medicaid deliveries, the ability of physicians to modify their 
behavior based on insurance type might be limited, and physicians might treat 
Medicaid deliveries as privately insured deliveries and hold mothers in hospital as the 
mandated time of the early discharge laws after early discharge laws became 
effective.  So their postpartum lengths of stay were affected by the laws.  For 




acknowledge the fact that Medicaid deliveries are not covered by California and 
Federal early discharge laws and did not adjust their treatment to Medicaid deliveries, 
and the Medicaid deliveries were not affected by the laws.  We would like to test this 
hypothesis by estimating the following model: 
 
(3) Yikt =  NEWBORNiktβ1 + PARENTS iktβ2 + HOSPiktβ3 + 
STATELAWt*PAYERiα1 FEDLAWt*PAYERi α2 + 
HSAREAk*HOSP_SIZEk*PAYERi*MTRENDtβ4 + 
HSAREAk*HOSP_SIZEk*PAYERi β5 + INDEX90180tβ6  +  MONTHt + 
DAYt + εikt 
 
We still restrict our regressions to Medicaid deliveries.  PAYER is 1 where faction of 
Medicaid deliveries is less than 29.5%, the 25 percentile of faction of Medicaid 
deliveries; PAYER is equal to 2 when faction of Medicaid deliveries is bigger than 
29.5% and smaller than 53.7%; PAYER is equal to 3 when faction of Medicaid 
deliveries is within 53.7% and 74.9%, and PAYER is equal to 4 when faction of 
Medicaid deliveries is higher than 74.9%.   
Table 2-11 reports the regression results of model (3).  For Medicaid covered 
uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, we find that the federal law reduced early discharge 
rates of newborns by 15.17 percentage points, 12.35 percentage points, 8.08 
percentage points and 10.74 percentage points respectively for PAYER 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
The standard errors on these estimates are incredibly small and the results are 




as our expectation, with the increase of faction of Medicaid deliveries in a hospital; 
the Medicaid deliveries were less affected by early discharge laws.  For payer 4, the 
results is not as our expectation, and the law still has effects on early discharge rates 
of Medicaid deliveries and this may be caused by the effect of early discharge laws 
on Medicaid managed care covered deliveries.  For complicated vaginal deliveries, 
we could see the similar pattern of effect of federal law.   
For cesarean delivery samples, federal early discharge law reduced early 
discharge rates of newborns by 6.37 percentage points, 5.42 percentage points, and 
0.38 percentage points respectively for PAYER 1, 2 and 3.  For payer 4 where there 
were very high factions of Medicaid deliveries, instead of decreasing early discharge 
rate, the federal law increased early discharge rate by 2.31 percentage points and the 
results are not statistically significant.  For cesarean deliveries with complications, the 
effect of federal law was smaller, and we could see the similar pattern that the 
coefficient on the (Federal Law x Payer) variable increases monotonically as Payer 
variable moves from 1 to 4.  The state law is estimated to not have reduced early 
discharges for c-sections by a statistically significantly amount in either sample. 
Table 2-11 also reports results with length of stay of newborns as outcome 
variable.  For vaginal deliveries, federal law increased average length of stay of 
newborns although the results do not decrease monotonically as Payer variable moves 
from 1 to 4.  For cesarean deliveries, the federal law increased average length of stay 
of newborns for payer 1, 2, and 3.  For payer 4, the federal law decreased average 
length of stay of newborns although the results are not statistically significant.  That 




variable.  For cesarean deliveries in hospitals with very high fraction of Medicaid 
deliveries, they were not impacted by the law  
 From the results, we do get evidence that behavior of physicians were affected 
by fraction of Medicaid deliveries in the hospital. The absolute effect of laws 
decreases monotonically as fraction of Medicaid deliveries increased.  Especially for 
cesarean deliveries, in hospitals with very high fraction of Medicaid deliveries, early 
discharge laws even increased early discharge rates and decreased average length of 
stay although the results are not statistically significant.  However, the hypothesis of 
behavior of physicians could not explain why for vaginal deliveries, Medicaid 
deliveries were also affected by the law when Payer is equal to 4, that is, faction of 
Medicaid deliveries were very high. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we use a large change in postpartum length of stay generated 
by the passage of a state and federal law to examine the effect of longer stays on the 
health of newborns. We show that the impact of the induced increase in length-of-stay 
varied substantially across patients with the increase largest for vaginal deliveries and 
patients covered by private insurance.  However, we find large changes in length of 
stay for Medicaid patients who were not covered by the law and for patients whose 
mothers experienced complications during pregnancy or labor.  In all, the federal law 
is estimated to reduce the fraction of vaginally delivery newborns covered by private 
insurance by 27 to 30 percentage points privately insured c-section delivered infants 




 At the same time, we witnessed reductions in the fraction of babies with 28-
day readmission rates.  2SLS estimates suggest that for children whose mothers had 
cesarean deliveries or had complications during pregnancy or labor, an extra day in 
the hospital will reduce readmission rates by one percentage point which is 30 to 10 
percent of sample means.  In contrast, we do not find any statistically significant 
medical benefit for infants whose mothers had vaginal deliveries without 
complications. 
 It is worth noting that there are a number of limitations to the current study.  
First, we are studying only one state.  To the extent that the effect of these laws 
differed in other states the results presented here may not generalize.  Second, we do 
not have the detailed information about follow-up visits for early discharge deliveries, 
and thus can only speculate that the reductions in readmission rates are produced by 





Chapter 3: Hospital Union Certification Elections and Outcomes 
of Nursing Personnel 
 
3.1 Overview 
Between 1954 and 1998, the fraction of workers that were union members 
declined from 33.5 to 13.3 percent (Farber and Western 2000).  The decline in 
unionization is fairly widespread in the economy with rates falling in the 
manufacturing, construction, transportation, communication, and public utility 
industries.  One industry that has bucked this trend is however hospitals.  In 1961 
only 3.2 percent of all nonfederal hospitals had formal collective bargaining 
agreements.  This low unionization rate in this sector was determined in part by 
Federal law that prohibited unions from organizing in not-for-profit hospitals.  In 
1974, this restriction was relaxed and unionization rates have increased dramatically.  
By the middle of 1970s, one of every five hospitals had collective bargaining 
contracts and the percent of the hospital labor force unionized stood at 22.4 percent 
(Becker and Miller 1981).  By the end of 1990s, roughly 35 percent of hospitals had 
formal registered nurse collective bargaining agreements (Ash and Seago 2002). 
Although the legal environment allowed many more hospitals to be 
represented by collective bargaining, changes in the structure of the health care 
market have also encouraged hospital nurses to seek collective bargaining.  Over the 




government involvement in health care through the Medicare and Medicaid program, 
the emergence of managed health care, and accelerating technological advancement.  
These forces have produced remarkable changes in the market structure of the 
hospital sector, with many hospital mergers and restructurings.  For nursing 
personnel, especially Registered nurses (RNs), the changing market structure also 
produce job restructuring which usually included reduced staffing levels, increased 
workloads, and expanded responsibilities (Greiner 1996).  As a result of these 
workplace changes, nursing personnel indicated the desire for a greater voice in the 
hospital organization (Clark 2001).   
With collective bargaining, unions negotiate with hospitals not only on wage 
and benefits, but also on minimum staffing levels, overtime hours and employment of 
nursing personnel such as, the ratio of RNs to Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) and 
aides.19F20  Since labor costs are the largest components of hospitals costs, and 
Needleman et al. (2002) found that the quantity and quality of nursing care are likely 
to be highly related to outcomes of patients, it is very important to examine the effect 
of unionization on wage and employment of nursing personnel and outcomes of 
patients. 
Although there is a large literature in economics that examines the economic 
impact of unions on a variety of outcomes, such as wages and productivity, there is a 
fairly small literature examining the same issues for hospitals.  A few papers have 
examined the impact of hospital unions on wages, and almost all of them are cross 
                                                 
20 Registered nurse (RN) is a graduate nurse who has passed examinations for registration; Licensed 
Practical nurse (LPN) is a nurse who has enough training to be licensed by a state to provide routine 
care for the sick; Aides is someone who assists a nurse in tasks that require little formal training.  So 




sectional-studies using individual-level data.  Only two papers have examined the 
impact of unions on product quality.  Seago and Ash (2002) argue that union 
representation may affect quality of care to patients through several mechanisms.  
Unions could improve the quality of care by raising wages, decreasing turnover, 
negotiating increased staffing levels, or facilitating communication between nursing 
personnel and management.  However, unions could jeopardize patient safety by 
creating an adversarial work environment, decreasing management flexibilities and 
raising wages.   
All of the previous published papers that examined the impact of nurse unions 
on labor outcomes are cross sectional studies that treated the union variable as 
exogenous in regression models.  As we demonstrate below, this is a questionable 
assumption.  Hospitals experiencing a union certification election and those covered 
by collective bargaining are very different from other hospitals.  Based on union 
certification election reports from National Labor Relation Board (NLRB), union 
certification elections were more likely to occur in non-profit hospitals and hospitals 
with larger numbers of discharges.  Among hospitals holding union certification 
elections, smaller hospitals are more likely to win the election.  Union size has also 
shown in other contexts to predict a number of outcomes.  At the individual level, 
nurses with certain characteristics such as higher wages may be more likely to select 
into unions.  Therefore, an econometric model that examines this question must 
address the possibility that nurses and hospitals covered by collective bargaining are 




In this paper, we examine the impact of unionization on the wages and 
employment of nursing personnel, controlling for the possible non-random selection 
of people into unions and hospitals into union status.  We merge unionization and 
bargaining contract information from National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to hospital level data from the California 
Hospital Annual Financial.  With these data sets, we use a basic difference-in-
difference model to examine the impact of unions on employment outcomes such as 
nurse staff levels, average hourly earnings, hours and the use of contract employees.  
The panel nature of the data allows us to examine hospitals before and after union 
certification, using hospitals not subject to collective bargaining as controls.  The use 
of hospital fixed-effects allows us to purge the unobserved hospital-specific 
characteristics that may have led to union certification in the first place.   
After unionization, we find great utilization of aides who are lower-skilled 
nursing personnel compared to RNs and LPNs and large increase in the use of 
contract nursing personnel, who are not usually union members, relative to regular 
nursing personnel after hospital employees lost unionization elections.  The staffing 
ratio of nursing personnel per discharge or per bed days were not statistically 
significantly affected by unionization.  By comparing results from difference in 
difference regressions with cross sectional regressions for average hourly earnings of 
nursing personnel, we do see evidence of selection that unions are more likely 
organized in higher paid hospitals.  In contrast to the vast literature on unionization in 




personnel decreased after hospital unionized.  This result could be caused by less 
usage of expensive overtime hours after hospital won the unionization elections.   
We also examine the impact of unions using individual-level data from the 
Out-going rotation samples of the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Respondents in 
the CPS are interviewed for the same four months over a two year period.  During the 
fourth and eighth months in the survey, which are exactly a year apart, respondents 
are asked detailed questions about employment including hours of work, weekly 
earnings and union-status.  By merging observations across the year, we construct a 
one-year panel for CPS respondents.  Using respondents who change unionization 
status during the year as a treatment group, we estimate a difference-in-difference 
with people not changing union status as a control group.  In this analysis, we do not 
see evidence of selection by nurses into union status in that OLS and fixed-effect 
estimates are very similar.  We find small positive effects of unions on wages and 
little of any impact on hours of work.  We attempt to reconcile the difference in the 
results across the two samples.   
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Literature on Hospital Unionization 
The rapid increase in hospital unions occurs primarily in the late 1960s and 
1970s.  In 1961, estimates indicate that only three percent of all hospitals had labor 
agreement with their employees (AHA 1972).  By 1970, the figure approached 15 
percent and for certain sectors, such as federal government hospitals, the 




five hospitals had contracts and the percent of the hospital labor force unionized was 
on the order of 22.4 percent.  By 1980, 27.4 percent of the nation’s hospitals 
(Beckerm 1982) and over 20 percent of registered nurses (Brint and Dodd 1984) had 
collective bargaining contracts.  By 2000, based on collective bargaining contract 
expiration notices from Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), around 
35 percent of the nation’s hospitals have collective bargaining contracts.  
Part of the growth in hospital unions has been generated by changes in Federal 
legislation.  In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act excluded nonprofit hospitals from the 
definition of employer in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  In 1974 
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, private non-profit hospitals and other healthcare 
institutions were brought under the Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board (Farkas 1978).  Thus, nearly half of the industry’s 7,000 hospitals (1976) 
employing 1.6 million workers were subject to the representation machinery and 
organizing protection of federal law.  
There are three basic ways that hospital employees can obtain union 
representation (Becker and Miller 1981).  First, an employer can voluntarily consent 
to recognize a labor organization.  Second, an already-unionized industry or company 
expands its employment.  Third, a union can be successful in a representation 
election.  Voluntary recognition is nonexistent in the hospital industry, and, although 
the industry has been expanding, the healthcare industry had been lightly unionized in 
the recent past.  Moreover, the incidence of union security agreements that would 
provide a device for automatically recruiting members is also low (BNA, 1976).  As a 




If a group of workers gain legal recognition as provided for by the National 
Labor Relation Act (NLRA), they are legally protected from being fired for 
association with a union and can only be “replaced” under specified conditions; most 
importantly, the law dictates that the employer bargain with the union “in good faith”.   
In the typical situation where union recognition is achieved through an 
election, employers are thought to generally oppose the organization drive (Kleiner 
2001) because the union could have been voluntarily recognized by the employer.  At 
the same time, there is a sense that in the healthcare industry, efforts to unionize are 
driven primarily by employees’ low job satisfaction, especially among nursing 
personnel. For example, Clark et al. (2001) reported the results of a survey of the 
workplace experiences of hospital based RNs under healthcare reform and found that 
nurses who had experienced reform-related mergers or job restructuring held a more 
negative perception of the climate for patient care, and indicated a greater readiness 
than other nurses to vote for a union.  Breda (1997) showed that the main impetus of 
unionization were factors such as poor working conditions, frustration with hospital 
management, low staff patients ratio and denial of an autonomous professional 
practice, not poor wages.   
The notion that union certification elections are driven solely by worker 
disaffection is however a rather narrow view of the process.  Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel (1969) adopted an alternative and more parsimonious approach suggesting 
that, ‘an employee’s decision to join a union will depend upon his subjective 
assessment of the expected benefits to be obtained from union membership against 




notion of union elections, nursing personnel (RNs, LPNs and aides) who comprise a 
large and significant employee group of hospitals are turning more to unionization as 
means of upgrading their position in hospitals (Wilson et al. 1990).  Aside from 
allowing collective bargaining in nonprofit institutions after 1974, a number of other 
forces such as the rise of managed care especially health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), legislative action to contain costs through Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRGs), and hospital merger and hospital restructuring, have raised concerns among 
hospital personnel about compensation and job security issues.  More and more 
frequently, hospital employees are resorting to union organizing efforts as a means to 
address these concerns.  
 
3.2.2 The Effect of Hospital Union: A Literature Review 
Only a few researchers have examined the effects of union on the wages of 
registered nurse (RN).  Most of these have used cross sectional samples and these 
studies typically demonstrate that hospital unions have a modest impact on wages of 
registered nurses.  Feldman and Scheffler (1982), for example, used data from a 
national probability sample of 1,200 hospitals in 1977 to estimate the effect of unions 
on wage and fringe benefits in four occupations: registered nurses, practical nurses, 
secretaries, and housekeepers.  Unions are estimated to increase wages by about 8 
percent for both types of nurses and 11 to 12 percent for secretaries and housekeepers 
employed in hospitals.   
Using data from questionnaires sent to 3,982 short-term general medical-




Koziara (1992) examined how the presence and number of bargaining units within a 
hospital affect wages and the frequency of strikes in hospitals.  They found little 
evidence that multiple bargaining units raised wages and strikes.   
Using data extracted from the 1985 through 1993 Current Population Survey 
(CPS), Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) obtained union premium for all RNs of about 3 
percent (and for hospital RNs about 2 percent), while for LPNs and nursing aides are 
4.6 and 12.4 percent.  Also using 1973 through 1994 CPS dataset, Hirsch and 
Schumacher (1998) found that standard union premium estimates are substantially 
lower among workers in health care than in other sectors of the economy, and smaller 
among higher-skill than among lower-skill occupations.  
Results from studies that have examined the impacts of unions on benefits and 
working environment of nursing personnel are also mixed.  Using data from 
questionnaires returned from 144 short term general care hospitals in Illinois, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, Becker (1979) found that direct union effects on fringe 
benefits (value of all fringe benefits, including pension, ‘time off’ with pay, etc.) were 
around 8.8 percent while indirect or spillover effects are on the order of 3.2 percent.  
Sloan and Elnicki (1978) found neither RN staffing nor RN turnover were 
significantly affected by unionizations.  Salkever (1982) found that unionization 
increased production costs by 5 to 9 percent, with the bulk of this increase resulting 
from factors other than wage increases, however, Salkever (1982) did not examine the 
mechanism how unionization affects production costs other than through wage 




cost-based payment is more prevalent, and smaller for RNs and other service 
employees. 
There are several mechanisms through which unions may affect the quality of 
care received by patients.  Results from Aiken et al. (1999) showed that higher nurse 
to patient ratios and AIDS physician specialty services were strongly associated with 
lower mortality.  A review of the literature by Lang et al. (2004) concluded that 
although the literature offers no support for specific minimum nurse-patient ratios for 
acute care hospitals, total nursing hours and skill mix do appear to affect some 
important patient outcomes.  Organization of care affects patient outcomes and the 
presence or absence of a union may affect the organization of care, unions may 
impact patient outcomes.  Also noted above, the main impetus of unionization were 
not low wages but instead of factors such as poor working conditions and low staff 
patients ratio, and therefore, it is reasonable to expect that unionization might impact 
patient outcomes if unions could alter these hospital characteristics.   
Little systematic research has examined whether the presence or absence of 
nurse unions affect patient outcomes.  Seago and Ash (2002) examined the 
relationship between the presence of a bargaining unit for registered nurses and the 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality rate for acute care hospitals in 
California.  Their study found that having an RN union significantly lowered the risk-
adjusted AMI mortality rate.  The authors did not however identify the mechanism 
how unions improved outcomes. 
In a more recent paper, Ash and Seago (2004) examined the same question as 




that unionized hospitals have certain important but unobservable characteristics, 
independent of unionization, that affect patient care.  By doing specification tests like 
checking the effect of non-healthcare union or the effect of future unionization, they 
found results similar to those in their previous paper, that hospitals with unionized 
RN’s have 5.5 percent lower heart attack mortality than do non-union hospitals.  The 
variable for union in the data set they used is registered nurse union status, so this 
variable contains little information on how and when the union was formed.  With the 
cross-sectional data instead of panel data, they could not compare the effect of union 
before and after the hospital became unionized.  
To summarize, the bulk of the estimates to date suggest that nurse unions raise 
wages but the relative wage impact is rather small, on the order of a few percentage 
point changes in wages.  There have been few studies that have examined how 
unionization affects the employment of nursing personnel, and to validate the benefits 
or hindrances of unionization on nursing personnel and patients.  All of the studies 
mentioned above have however been cross-sectional in natures that have treated 
union status as exogenous.  Therefore, if unions are more likely to appear in hospitals 
with particular characteristics (e.g., hospitals with already higher wages) then these 





3.3 Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 Process of Hospital Union Certification Elections 
Moving from initial discussions about union organization until certification is 
a long and difficult process.  Dinardo and Lee (2004, p. 5), provide a brief summary 
of prototypical timeline of the union representation process. 
 
“1.  A group of workers who interested in being represented by a union 
contact a labor union and ask for assistance in beginning an organizing 
drive. 
2.  The employees begin a “card drive” to petition the NLRB to hold an 
election.  Unions need to get cards from at least 30% of the workers to 
be granted an election by the NLRB. 
3.  After the card have been submitted, the NLRB makes ruling on 
whether the people the union seeks to represent have a “community of 
interest”, a coherent group for the purposes of bargaining and makes a 
determination of which categories of employees fall within the union’s 
“bargaining unit”. 
4.  Then, the NLRB holds an election at the work site.  A simple majority 
(50 percent plus 1 vote) is required for the union to win. 
5.  Within 7 days after the final tally of the ballots, parties can file 
objections to how the election was conducted.  With sufficient 




rule to invalidate the outcome of an election and conduct another one 
thereafter. 
6.  If after this, a union still has a simple majority, then the union is 
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit, and the 
employer is obligated to negotiate “in good faith” with that union.” 
 
At any point in the certification process, the union organization effort could be 
terminated.  After a group of hospital employees decide to start the certification 
process, in most cases, employers and management would resist union organizing 
drives.  Based on Bronfenbrenner (1994), multiple tactics could be adopted by 
employers to delay or deny a collective bargaining agreement, with the most often 
used being “captive meeting,”20F21 “firing union activists”, “hiring management 
consultants” and “alleging other unfair labor practices”.  “Firing union activists” 
refers to the situation that large number of campaigns never made it to an election 
because the employer discharged workers early in the union campaign even though 
the NLRB has the power to order reinstatement of those discharged workers.  
Bronfenbrenner (1994, p.81), notes “the workers were reinstated before the election 
in only 34% of the campaigns in which there were discharges for union activity.”  
Examples of “alleging other unfair labor practices” are interfering with the formation 
of labor union, and discriminate against employees for engaging in union activities, 
etc.  Many union organizing attempts would be terminated at this point. 
                                                 
21 A captive meeting is an “all hands” meeting where the employer bring all the eligible employees in a 
union vote together to do the following: tell the employees how disappoint he is in this union effort; 
tell the employees that a union – third party between the employer and employees are not necessary, 




Even if a union certification election is held, the outcome of the election 
would be determined by multiple factors.  Becker and Miller (1981) divided the 
possible influences into organizational characteristics such as hospital sizes, and 
employee-management relations, environmental characteristics such as the 
unionization status of nearby hospitals, the nature of the outside union organization, 
etc., and the election process.  Becker and Miller also found that unions were more 
likely to win the elections in hospitals with a winning history, hospitals with lower 
voter turnout (since there is not a great deal of leeway for management action to get 
out the vote) and smaller unit size.   
As the previous paragraphs indicate, the union certification process is long 
and difficult and the results are very uncertain from the start.  The probability of 
holding a union certification election and a union election victory reflects the interests 
of three actors, the employees, the outside union organization, and management, and 
their respective power and ability to implement those interests.  Given these diverse 
interests and the difficulty of the process, it should be no surprise that unions are 
more likely to appear in some types of hospitals.   
Are there ex ante systematic differences among union election winners, losers 
and hospitals with no union elections?  The size of hospitals and the organizational 
characteristics of hospitals like whether the hospitals are for profit or not for profit 
have been examined, and they do matter.  Table 3-1 lists the characteristics of 
hospitals in California who are unionized or not in year 1999 by using California 
Hospital Annual Financial data linked with National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) 




(FMCS).  This data is outlined in more detail below.  Hospitals with more beds and 
more discharges were more likely to be unionized.  Hospitals owned by church or 
other non-profit organization were less likely to be unionized, and hospitals owned by 
a county government were more likely to be unionized.  
Table 3-2 lists statistics of hospitals in 1998 that won or lost union 
certification election during the 1990 to 2000 period.  In contrast to the results from 
the previous table, the characteristics of winners and lowers were much more similar.  
Among hospitals that held union certification elections, hospitals with fewer beds and 
fewer discharges were, on average, more likely to win the elections, although the 
differences in the beds and number of discharges between those two kinds of 
hospitals are not statistically significant.  In general, there are far fewer differences 
between hospitals with winning and losing elections than there are when comparing 
union and non-union hospitals.  Subsequently, disparities in characteristics between 
union and non-union hospitals are generated by which hospitals start and make it to 
the certification process, not which hospitals win union elections.   
These results suggest hospital unions appear in a select type of hospital and 
therefore, care must be taken to control for hospital characteristics in OLS regressions 
of wages on union status.  For example, Table 3-1 indicates that unions are more 
likely to appear in larger hospitals and for profit hospitals.  Previous research has also 
established that wages tend to be higher in exactly these types of hospitals.  
Inadequate controls for hospital characteristics may then lead to an overestimation of 
the union wage effect.  If the union status of hospitals is not random and certain types 




and inconsistent.  For this reason, we choose to exploit the longitudinal nature and use 
a fixed effect and difference-in-difference model to estimate the union impacts.  The 
fixed effect model purges the difference between unionized and non-unionized 
hospitals, 
 
3.3.2 Data Description 
The econometric model we use throughout this paper is a standard difference-
in-difference model where we compare outcomes of hospitals before and after union 
certification elections to the same differences for hospitals that do not change their 
union status.  The panel nature of the data allows us to hold constant unmeasured 
hospital specific factors that may be correlated with both the propensity to organize 
and labor outcomes.   
The econometric model requires a panel data set of hospitals and time-varying 
information on union status.  We constructed just such a data set by combining 
several data sets including the National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) election 
reports for hospital union certification elections held from 1984 to 2000, contract 
expiration notices from Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) from 
1978 to 2001 through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, and the 
California Hospital Annual Financial data, 1980-2002. 
The records from the NLRB have information such as the dates of the filing of 
the petition, the election, and the closing of the case, eventual vote tallies, as well as 




industry of the establishment in question. Also, the records contain the establishment 
name and exact address.    
From the FMCS data, we obtain information on contract expiration notices 
which are required by Federal law to be filed.  According to the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (29 CFR 1425.2), “In order that the Service may provide assistance to the 
parties, the party initiating negotiations shall file a notice with the FMCS Notice 
Processing Unit … as least 30 days prior to the expiration or modification date of an 
existing agreement, or 30 days prior to the re opener date of an existing 
agreement…”.  Thus, the contract expiration notices filed from the establishment 
provide us with a measure of collective bargaining “activity” both before and after the 
election.  More importantly, this data identifies for us hospitals that are unionized 
before the start of our sample period. 
Within four months of their fiscal (accounting) year end, California licensed 
hospitals must submit an annual financial report that includes a detailed income 
statement, balance sheet, statements of revenue and expense, and supporting 
schedules.  These financial reports are based on a uniform accounting and reporting 
system developed and maintained by the California Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD) and are undergone a thorough desk audit.  The 
report includes the average hourly earnings, productive hours (hours actually worked) 
and nonproductive hours (paid time off, including vacation, sick-leave, and holidays) 
for different categories of personnel, such as Registered Nurses (RNs), Licensed 
Practical Nurses (LPNs), aides and orderlies which are the groups of nursing staff we 




 As Spetz et al. (1999, 2001) and Currie et al. (2005) reported, the OSHPD 
financial data are quite noisy.  Non-standard reporting periods and multiple reports in 
a single year are some of the most important problems.  In this study, we solved the 
problem of noisy data by deleting the observations with non-standard reporting period 
and multiple reports in a single year and only leaving the full year observation.  Over 
20% observations were deleted with this step.  
Based on the information of election reports from NLRB, Figure 3-1 depicts 
the change of total union election cases and union election cases that won or lost 
elections in U.S. hospitals from year 1984 to 2000.  The numbers in Figure 3-1 
indicate that the annual number of union elections held was relatively stable 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s with a slow drift downwards in total counts during 
the period.  Starting in the early 1990s, the fraction of cases won by the union rose 
slightly.   
The unionization information of hospitals from NLRB election reports and 
FMCS contract expiration notices are merged with California Hospital Annual 
Financial data by hospital name and address.  From 1992 to 2000, 31 hospitals held 
union certification elections, of which, 20 hospitals won the elections and 
successfully organized union.  At the end of 1999, there were 416 hospitals reporting 
financial data, and among them, 123 hospitals or 30% hospitals were unionized 
hospitals.  This unionization rate is lower than 35% hospitals unionization rate from 
Ash and Seago (2002).  The reasons are that rehabilitation hospitals, long term care 
hospitals and Kaiser Foundation hospitals which have higher unionization rates, do 




report contract expiration notices to FMCS.  We end up with annual level 
observations for each hospital level data set with unionization information and 
measures of outcomes of nursing personnel.   
 
3.3.3 Outcome Variables 
There are several variables that we use to measure the earnings and 
employment of nursing personnel.  The first group is the average hourly earnings of 
RN, LPN and aides.  The earning information in the California Hospital Financial 
data set is the average hourly earnings paid that is constructed by summing total 
wages paid and dividing by all productive hours.  Overtime pay and premium pay for 
on-call or stand-by time are also included in salaries and wages.  Productive hours are 
the actual hours worked which equals total hours paid (including overtime) less the 
hours not on the job.  Hours not on the job include vacation time, sick time, holidays 
and other paid time-off.  Non-productive hours are counted as employee benefits and 
are hours not on the job such as vacation time, sick leave, holidays, and other paid 
time off.   
The next outcome measures are the utilization of productive hours and the 
fraction of hours for different types of nursing personnel: RNs, LPNs and aides.  RNs 
are more highly trained than LPNs, and LPNs are more skilled than aides.  Productive 
hours are actual working hours and include regular working hours and overtime 
hours.  The fraction of hours worked by each type of nurse is calculated as the hours 
of nursing for each type divided by the sum of productive hours for all nurses.  One 




personnel like RNs with lower-skilled nursing personnel like LPNs and aides.21F22  
Needleman et al. (2002) found shorter length of stays and lower rates of urinary tract 
infections when care was provided by RNs instead of LPNs or aides.  Unruh (2003a) 
found a greater incidence of nearly all adverse events occurred in hospitals with fewer 
licensed nurses, so the welfare of patients might be jeopardized by the utilization of 
lower-skilled nursing personnel.  If hospital unions raise the cost of some nurses more 
than others, then hospitals may respond by hiring a different mix of nurses.   
Labor costs are a large fraction of total cost for hospitals.22F23  Previous work by 
Salkever (1982) has argued that that hospital labor cost increases after hospital 
become unionized.  Therefore, labor cost on RNs, LPNs, and aides and relative 
expenditure on different types of nursing personnel are also outcome variables in this 
study.  Hospital expenditures on RNs, LPNs and aides are calculated as hours 
multiplied by average hourly earnings.   
 Another outcome variable is the utilization of RN, LPNs and aides per 
discharge or per bed days.  Unionization may encourage hospitals to change the 
absolute level of nursing resources used.  However, since there is some evidence that 
relative inputs in hospitals impact outcomes, we also divide the inputs by outputs 
such as bed days.    
The last outcome variable we examine is the utilization of contract nursing 
personnel.  The California Hospital Financial data set starts reporting the average 
                                                 
22  Unruh (2001) found that during period 1991 to 1997, the utilization of licensed nursing staff 
declined while nursing assistants increased in Pennsylvania hospitals.  Unruh (2003b) concluded that 
during period 1991 to 2000, there were a slightly decrease in the utilization of RN relative to LPN in 
Pennsylvania hospitals. 
23 Based on Underlying causes of rising health care cost:  hearing before the Committee on Finance, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, October 6, 1993, on average, labor 




hourly earnings and hours of contract nursing personnel in year 1993.  However, the 
data only reports the average wage and hours of contract RN, LVN and aides 
together.  Since contract nursing personnel are usually not union members, they could 
be substitutes for more expensive unionized nursing personnel.  Therefore, the 
utilization of contract nursing personnel is an important measure of effect of 
unionization on employment of nursing personnel.  Since the contract nursing 
personnel information is only available year 1992 and on, we restrict all regressions 
to the 1992 to 2000. 
3.3.4 Estimation Models 
To measure the impact of union election result on labor outcomes of hospital 
employees, we use a basic difference-in-difference estimator.  We would like to 
compare the outcomes of nursing personnel before and after the union certification 
elections.  A simple comparison of outcomes for these workers before and after the 
treatment could produce a biased estimate of the impact of unions if factors that occur 
at the same time as the treatment are not adequately captured by covariates.  For 
example, inflation-adjusted wages of nurses were falling in the 1990s so a simple 
difference estimator may understate the true impact of unionization on wages if these 
factors are not considered.  To estimate the change in outcomes of nursing personnel 
that would have occurred in treated hospitals in the absence of intervention, we 
include hospitals that did not change their union status in the comparison group.  This 
is a standard difference-in-difference model that compares the change in outcomes of 




of nursing personnel of control hospitals.  The specific model we estimate is outlined 
in equation (1): 
 
(1) ittiititit YEARLOSTWONY εμθθ ++++= 21  
 
The dependent variable itY  is a measure of average hourly earnings or 
employment hours of different types of nursing personnel.  The subscript i  represents 
each hospital, and t is time.  The dummy variable itWON  is the treatment variables of 
interest that equals 1 in hospitals after a successful union certification election and 0 
otherwise.  A comparison variable LOSTit equals 1 in hospitals after a failed 
certification election.  The parameters 1θ  and 2θ  are therefore the key outcomes of 
interest.  The variable iμ  is a hospital-specific fixed effect that controls for permanent 
differences across hospitals of the outcomes of their nursing personnel and tYEAR  
measures year fixed effect.  The remaining variable is ihtε  which is an idiosyncratic 
error.  We control for possible autocorrelation in errors by allowing for arbitrary 
correlations in errors within a hospital level over time.  There are no other 
independent variables to control for hospital characteristics in the model, since all the 
other hospital level variables in the data set such as size, location and ownership do 
not vary over time and therefore are captured by hospital fixed effects.  
Union certification election may not permanently change hospitals or they 
may take some time to tale effect.  Therefore, we compare the outcomes of nursing 




after the union elections. ittoWON 21  is set to 1 one and two year after the union 
certification elections and itPLUSWON3 equals 1 after that period.  ittoLOST 21  and 




ittiititititit YEARPLUSLOSTtoLOSTPLUSWONtoWONY εμθθθθ ++++++= 321321 4321
 
3.3.5 Potential Problem of Using the Fixed Effect Model 
 The difference in difference model outlined above includes a complete set of 
hospital fixed effect iμ  to controls for permanent differences across hospitals that 
may be correlated with both the propensity to become unionized and the outcomes of 
interest such as earnings.  By construction, the model captures those unmeasured 
hospital characteristics that do not vary over time.  If the reason that hospitals become 
unionized is because of these unmeasured but fixed characteristics, then the fixed 
effects will capture these differences and produce consistent estimates of the 
unionization effect.  If however hospitals become unionized because of an 
unmeasured time-varying characteristic that is also correlated with the outcomes of 
interest, than the model may produce inconsistent estimates.   
 These time varying shocks are a source of concern for this analysis.  During 
the past decade, hospital operations have been impacted in important ways by trends 
such as the emergence of managed health care, technological advancement, the 




responded to these structural changes by attempting to become more efficient in the 
production of healthcare services.  Pierson and Williams (1994) note that 63 percent 
of all hospitals engaged in some reengineering initiatives based on a survey of 1000 
hospitals in 1994.  These same changes in market structure and organization of 
healthcare may also provide an incentive for nursing personnel to become unionized.  
If the same factor that altered the incentive to unionize also altered labor market 
outcomes for nurses, then the model will generate biased estimates. 
 For example, suppose that a hospital facing stiff competition from a nearby 
hospital reduces the size of the hospital staff and trims back the annual raises for 
nurses.  In response, nurses successfully attempt to unionize.  In this case, the same 
factors that lead to lower growth in wages also lead to unionization so the model may 
attribute a lower wage to the union.  
 However, as we illustrate below, we examine a number of outcomes that 
signal something about the underlying characteristics of the hospital such as the total 
number of hospital discharges and average length of patient hospital stays.  As we 
note below, it appears that union status has no impact on these outcomes. The results 
provide some evidence that there were no structural change of hospital operations 
after nursing personnel got unionized, and our fixed effect assumption about hospitals 
are supported by those results. 
3.4 Results 
Table 3-3 presents regression results for the difference-in-difference models 
outlined in equations (1) and (2) with average hourly earnings of RNs, LPNs and 




outcome variables.  Each row represents one regression, and the first column lists the 
dependent variable for each regression.  In contrast to the vast literature on union 
relative wage effects, these results indicate that for RNs and LPNs, average hourly 
earnings decreased no matter the hospital won or lost a unionization election although 
for LPNs, the effect of unionization on log average hourly earnings are not 
statistically significant.  For RNs, average hourly earnings decreased by 5.66 percent 
after hospitals won unionization elections, and this result is statistically significant at 
10% level.  Based on model (2), for RNs, the average hourly earnings reduction 
happened within two years after hospital won the unionization elections.  For aides 
and managers, the unionization election did not statistically significantly affect their 
average wage rate.  
 The results from Table 3-3 are contrary to previous literature which has 
established that union members realize wage premiums, not only among nurses in 
particular but for most workers in general.  The differing results could be explained 
by some important differences between this study and previous analyses of hospital 
unions.  First, we use a hospital-level data set instead of one with individual-level 
data.  With individual level data, workers who migrate to unions may earn more than 
people who remain non-unionized, but, this does not identify what wages would have 
been in the establishment if it were not unionized. Second and more importantly, 
most previous studies use cross-sectional regressions.  In our panel data set, we use 
hospital fixed effects to control for the possibility that certain types of hospitals are 




To compare the regression results for a  panel data with difference in 
difference regression model to previous results from a cross sectional data set, in 
Table 3-4, we estimate a model where we ignore the longitudinal nature of the data23F24 
and estimate cross-sectional regressions.  Instead of adding hospital fixed effects, we 
add variables that describe the characteristics including measure of hospital size24F25, 
hospital service area and ownership of hospitals.  In Table 3-4, for all kinds of 
nursing personnel, the average earned wage increased by a statistically significant 
amount after hospitals won unionization elections.  For RNs, the average wage 
increased by 4.31 percent, for LPNs, it was 2.09 percent and for aides, the average 
wage increased by 2.36 percent.  Based on the regression results of model (2), the 
average wage increase occurred three or more years after hospitals won unionization 
elections.  These results indicate that the positive union wage premium found in most 
cross-sectional studies may be due to the fact that unions are more likely to appear in 
higher-wage hospitals.  Losing unionization elections did not affect the average wage 
of nursing personnel in a statistically significant or qualitatively important manner. 
So the cross sectional regression results are consistent with previous literature 
that unionized hospitals realized union wage premium.  Why are there differences 
between regression results using panel data and difference in difference model, and 
cross sectional regression results?  First, the cross sectional regressions are estimating 
the difference between unionized and non-unionized hospitals.  So the cross sectional 
                                                 
24  We use the same data set with each observation in the panel hospital level data as one cross 
sectional observation. 
25  We break hospitals up into 6 groups based on average monthly number of total cases. 
HOSP_SIZE=1 if average monthly case<=400; HOSP_SIZE=2 if 400 <average monthly case<= 1000; 
HOSP_SIZE=3 if 1000 <average monthly case<= 3000; HOSP_SIZE= 4 if 3000 <average monthly 






regression results are the average effects of unions of previous periods and the effects 
of unionization that occurs today.  Second, as previous stated, bigger hospitals are 
more likely to be unionized; hospitals owned by church or other non-profit 
organization were less likely to be unionized.  The fixed effect model purges the 
difference between unionized and non-unionized hospitals, but the cross sectional 
regression could not.  One last reason is that the wage measurement here is not actual 
wage of each individual nursing personnel, and they are average hourly wage rate 
measured by total salaries and wages paid (include overtime payment) divided by 
total productive hours, so either the change of numerator or denominator would affect 
the average hourly wage.  For now, we could not get the conclusion that unionization 
decreased wage of nursing personnel and do not know why average hourly wage 
decreased after unionization elections. 
Table 3-3 also report results of regressions with log total number of hospital 
discharges and average length of stay (LOS) of patients as dependent variables.  The 
objective is to check whether there were significant changes in hospital operations 
after hospital had unionization elections.  Based on the results in Table 3-3, 
unionization increased the number of discharges and decreased the average LOS of 
patients, but these results are not statistically significant.   
 Table 3-5 reports results where the outcome variables measure productive 
hours and relative utilization of RNs, LPNs and aides.  After hospitals won 
unionization elections, hospitals used more hours of RNs, LPNs and aides. However, 
utilization RNs and LPNs increased relative to aids, although these results are not 




certification election.  After hospital employees lost unionization elections, 23.96 
percent more aides’ hours were utilized and relative to productive hours of RNs and 
LPNs, 4.06 percentage points more aides’ hours were utilized.  Those results are 
statistically significant. So hospitals used more low-skilled nursing personnel after 
collective bargaining unit was not successfully organized within hospitals.  
 The effect of unionization on average expenditures on RNs, LPNs, and aides 
are presented in Table 3-6.  Labor costs are measured as hours multiplied by the 
average earned wage.  Since hospitals utilized more hours of aides after losing 
unionization elections, their aid costs were 50.53 percent higher.  For cost on different 
types of nursing personnel relative to the total labor cost on nursing personnel, after 
nursing personnel lost the unionization elections, hospitals spent 2.64 percentage 
points less on labor cost of RNs relative to the total labor cost on nursing personnel.  
Hospital labor costs on nursing personnel were not affected in a statistically 
significant manner by winning certification elections. 
 Table 3-7 reports the usage of RNs, LPNs and aides per discharge or per bed 
days.  From the regression results, the usage of RNs, LPNs and aides per discharge or 
per bed days were not significantly affected by winning or losing hospital 
unionization elections. 
 The regression results of contract nursing personnel are presented in Table 3-
8.  The California Financial data set reports contract RNs, LPNs, and aides together 
as contract nursing personnel.  Contract nursing personnel is complement to nursing 
personnel on payroll, and they usually do not involve in the unionization elections 




89.45 percent more contract nursing personnel than before.  The increase of 
utilization of hours of contract personnel was huge, but given the fact that the 
utilization of contract nursing personnel was only a very small percent (4.19%) of 
total hours of nursing personnel for a hospital, the increase was not that big in the 
term of absolute values.  The average hourly earnings of contract nursing personnel 
decreased although the result of average hourly earnings is not statistically 
significant.  Relative to hours of nursing personnel on payroll, less contract nursing 
personnel were utilized in three or more years after hospital became unionized and 
the result was not statistically significant.   
 To summarize, after hospital had unionization elections, the operation of 
hospitals are as the following: number of discharges increased and average LOS of 
patients decreased and those results were not statistically significant.  More hours of 
aides who are lower-skilled were utilized after hospitals lost unionization elections.  
After hospitals won unionization elections, more hours of contract nursing personnel 
who were not union members were utilized.   
As results from Table 3-4 indicate, the total hours of RNs, LPNs and aides 
increased after hospital became unionized although these results were not statistically 
significant.  There are two ways to increase the total hours of nursing personnel on 
payroll; one is to extract more hours from present nursing personnel (and maybe 
increasing overtime hours), and the second is to hire more nursing personnel.  If the 
hospital used the first strategy, then the average hourly earnings calculated by 
dividing earnings by hours should have increased since at the margin, overtime hours 




nursing personnel decreased making it unlikely that overtime hours increased.  This 
suggests that hospitals hired more nursing personnel and unionized nursing personnel 
worked less overtime hours after hospitals won the unionization elections.   
Average hourly earnings is calculated by using normal salaries plus overtime 
wage divided by the sum of normal working hours and overtime hours.  Nursing 
personnel were paid at a higher rate for overtime hours, so with the reduction of 
overtime hours, even if the normal salaries increased, salaries earned from overtime 
hours decreased, and for average hourly earnings, the numerator decreased at a bigger 
proportion compared to the denominator, so with the reduction of expensive overtime 
hours, the average hourly earnings decreased after hospital became unionized.  There 
are evidences from news and articles that nursing personnel worked less overtime 
hours after they were unionized.  However, since California Financial data set does 
not have information of number of nursing personnel, this hypothesis could not be 
tested in this paper. 
What happened in hospitals after hospitals had unionization elections?  If the 
hospital wins the unionization elections, a bargaining unit is formed, and the union 
bargains with hospitals on wage, hours, benefits, staffing ratio and etc.  For nursing 
personnel, less overtime hours are benefits from bargaining with hospitals and more 
contract nursing personnel are utilized as substitute of previous overtime hours of 
nursing personnel on payroll.  What really happened to the hourly earnings of nursing 
personnel?  The effect on hourly earnings could not be directly examined by using 
California Financial data set since only average hourly earnings are reported.  But one 




of nursing personnel decreases compared to before.  The next part reports direct 
evidence of effect of unionization on hourly earnings by using Current Population 
Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation group from year 1983-2004. 
 
3.5 Supplemental Evidence from the CPS-ORG Data Set 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 60,000 
households.  Each household entering the CPS is administered 4 monthly interviews, 
then ignored for 8 months, then interviewed again for 4 more months.  Month 4 and 8 
are called the outgoing rotation groups (ORG) because respondents leave the sample 
either temporarily or permanently.  In these months, respondents are asked questions 
of their union status, usual weekly earning, and usual weekly hours.  The lag between 
the month 4 and month 8 interviews is one year.  Responses from these months can 
be merged by household ID, age, occupation and other criteria to form a one-year 
panel data set. 
The CPS is a household-based survey and although an observation may have 
the same ID in a one-year period, these two observations may not represent the same 
person.  Based on the design of the data set, in order to match observations over time 
to form a panel, observations of the same person should meet the following criteria: 
share the same household id and same household number; have less than a two year 
age difference, same interview month and one year interview time difference.  The 
matching rate for years 1984, 1985, 1994, 1995 and 2004 are very poor due to the 




and for the whole sample are 74% percent, and this result is close to the 75% 
matching rate found by Hirsch & Schumacher (1998) for all workers.   
After merging the CPS-ORG data, we can use the occupation codes to restrict 
the sample to RNs, LPNs and aides, and use the industry codes to restrict these 
workers to hospital employees.  For the sub sample of RNs, LPNs and aides, the 
matching rate is 59% which is much lower than the rate for the general workforce.  
The low matching rate of nurses should be caused by the high turnover rate of nurses.  
According to the report Acute Care Hospital Survey of RN Vacancies and Turnover 
Rates in 2000 released in January 2002 by the 87HAmerican Organization of Nurse 
Executives, the average annual RN turnover rate in acute care hospitals was 21.3%.  
If job turnover is accompanied by a household move, then the respondent would not 
be interviewed in the sample twice.   
 With this sample, we can estimate models similar to the ones in the previous 
section but with individual-level data.  In these models, we compare the wages of 
nurses who move from union to nonunion status over the year and vice versa with 
nurses who do not change union status.  Again, this is a simple difference-in-
difference model that controls for the fact that different types of nurses are more or 
less likely to end up in unions.  This same type of methodology has been used by 
other authors to examine such questions as inter-industry wage differentials (Krueger 
and Summers 1988) and the effect of degree of generosity of workers’ compensation 
on injury duration (Meyer et al. 1995). 
Table 3-9 reports change of union status for interviewees for RN, LPN and 




union members in both month 4 and month 8, and 73.10% were not union member in 
either period.  Slightly more than 6% of interviewees joined a labor union and almost 
an equal number separated from a union.   
The following equation describes empirically the difference in difference 
model we estimate:  
 
(3) ittijiitjit YEARuOCCUPATIONUNIONY εθ +++= *  
 
Where itY  measures the labor market outcomes available in the CPS-ORG.  The 
observations vary across time and interviewees which are indexed by t and i 
respectively.  The variable iu  in model (3) is an individual fixed effect, tYEAR  is a 
year fixed effect and itε  is an error term.  UNION is a dummy variable that measures 
union status in year t for person i.  Since there are 3 occupations (RN, LPNs and 
aids), we allow the union effect to vary by occupation (j=1, 2, 3).   
 To examine whether certain types of workers selected into union jobs, we 
estimate a model similar to (3) that ignores the longitudinal nature of data.  This 
model is outlined in equation (4) 
 
(4) ittijiitjit YEARXOCCUPATIONUNIONY εαθ +++= 1*  
 
The vector iX  in model (4) includes a set of control variables that describe 




status, state, age and age squared.  In this model, we have exchanged the fixed 
individual effects for individual characteristics.    
 The key outcomes are natural logs of the reported hourly wage and weekly 
earning.  Hourly wage variable is only available for those who get paid by hour and 
weekly earning include tips and overtime pays.  Table 3-10 reports the sample 
descriptive statistics for each sub sample and total RN, LPN and aides sample.  The 
samples are for full time workers with usual hours of working per week higher than 
20 hours and hourly wage higher than $4.  Compared with samples of LPN and aides, 
there are higher percent of college graduate, higher percent of white, lower percent of 
black, lower percent of Hispanic in the RN sample.  On average RNs earned the 
highest hourly wage and worked fewer hours per week than LPN and aides.  
 To be comparable with results from California Financial data set, only data 
from year 1992 to 2000 are used in these regressions.  Regression results of 
difference in difference model (3) are presented in Table 3-11.  Weekly earning of 
RNs, LPNs and aids were 3.55 percent, 1.45 percent and 10.6 percent higher, 
respectively, after they became union members.  The regression results with hourly 
wage, and weekly earning divided by usual hours tell the similar story.  Aides 
realized the highest union wage premium compared to RNs and LPNs. 
Regression results of cross sectional model (4) are reported in Table 3-12.  
The results from regarding the data as cross sectional are very similar to results from 
estimating the difference in difference model by using panel data.  RNs, LPNs and 
aides earned a higher wage after they became union members. For weekly earning, 




LPNs and aides, their weekly earnings were 2.14 percent and 12.33 percent higher.  
Lower skilled nursing personnel like aides realized a higher percent of union wage 
premium than higher skilled nursing personnel like LPNs and RNs.   
We can see that regression results with hourly wage or weekly earnings as 
outcome variables by using difference in difference model (3) are very close to results 
using cross sectional regression model (4).  The fixed effect model purges the 
differences between unionized and non-unionized nurses.  From both regressions, 
nursing personnel who are union members earned a higher wage.  The consistency 
between the difference in difference model with fixed effect and cross sectional 
regressions means that at the individual level, workers with above average earnings 
potential were not more likely to select into unions.   
Based on Table 3-12, for RNs, LPNs and aides, their usual hours of working 
per week were not statistically significantly affected by whether they were union 
member or not.  For another measure of hours, hours worked last week, RNs worked 
1.0852 more hours after they became a union member.   
 The results from CPS data show that effect of unionization on individual level 
measure of wage, hourly wage and weekly earning.  However, for hours of working, 
CPS data does not have a good measure of overtime hours of RNs, LPNs and aides 
either.  We could not see direct evidence about how unionization affects overtime 
hours of RNs, LPNs and aides.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we use hospital level panel data set merged with unionization 




effect of unionization election, that is, effect of collective bargaining on wage and 
employment of nursing personnel.  Compared to previous cross sectional studies, we 
estimate what happens in hospitals after they become unionized.  This contrasts with 
most previous estimates that examine cross sectional differences in earnings for union 
and non unionized hospitals.  
 We find that after the failure of unionization elections, hospitals used more 
aides who are lower-skilled than RNs and LPNs who are higher-skilled.  This could 
jeopardize the health of patients.  After hospitals won unionization elections, more 
contract nursing personnel hours were utilized.  After unionization,  the average 
hourly wage of RNs and LPNs decreased by a statistically significant amount.  These 
results are consistent with a management policy of using more nurses but less 
overtime hours after union certification.  Although contract nurses may be less skilled 
than staff nurses, it is not clear what effect this would have on patient welfare since 
these workers may be substituting nurses who otherwise would have been on 
overtime and therefore, maybe more fatigued and less alert.   
 There are several limitations to this study. First, the hospital level financial 
data is not detailed enough to measure the effect of union on wages and overtime 
hours of particular individuals.  It would be useful to have detailed data of employees 
in hospitals.  Second, given the fact that wage is measured in the terms of average 
hourly earnings in California Hospital Financial data set, the effect of unionization on 
wages instead of average hourly earnings could not be examined.  Using merged CPS 
dataset, we find nursing personnel realized union wage premium as a union member.  




do not have evidence to measure the effect of union on overtime hours of nursing 
personnel.  Last, the unionization information is not detailed enough to measure the 
specific characteristics of contract bargaining unit and number of bargaining unit in a 
hospital.  We may also be understating the extent of unionization if hospitals failed to 










Chapter 4:  Concluding Remarks 
 
For effect of postpartum length of stay, 2SLS estimates suggest that for 
children whose mothers had cesarean deliveries or had complications during 
pregnancy or labor, an extra day in the hospital reduced readmission rates.  In 
contrast, we do not find any statistically significant medical benefit for infants whose 
mothers had vaginal deliveries without complications.  So requiring all deliveries to 
stay certain time in hospital is “a simple solution to a problem whose health 
consequences are unclear” as Declercq (1999).  The existence of high percent of early 
discharge even after the effectiveness of early discharge laws means the underlying 
effect of law is to ensure the coverage of insurance is not a factor to discharge 
mothers and newborns early from hospitals, and the time of discharge is a decision of 
the physicians in consultation with the mother.   
 For effect of hospital unionization, in the dissertation, the direct effect on 
nursing personnel were examined.  Effect on patient outcomes is the ultimate goal to 
study effect of unionization.  This could be done by using hospital patient level 
dataset such as state inpatient dataset.  If the individual level hospital nursing 
personnel is available, the mechanism how union affects patient outcomes could also 






Table 2-1   OLS Estimates of Length of Stay and Logit Estimates of 28-Day Readmission Equations,  
Newborns in California Private/Medicaid Sample, 1995 – 1996 
 
OLS Parameter Estimate or Marginal Effect 
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R2/-2 Log like. 0.0222 0.0086  0.0344 0.0169 
Note:  Standard errors in parenthesis.  Other covariates include month and year dummy variables.  The reference categories are Medicaid 
insurance, government hospital, girls, 3 or more complications during pregnancy or delivery, unmarried mothers, and mothers aged 36 or more 




Table 2-2   Sample Descriptive Statistics of Mothers,  
July 1995 – Dec 2000 
 
 Deliveries without complications Deliveries with complications 
 Vaginal C-sections Vaginal C-sections 
Mothers     
Mean age 27.72 29.25 27.60 29.03 
% Less than High School 32.44% 29.65% 29.08% 26.72% 
% White 81.13% 81.57% 79.34% 79.33% 
% Black 6.10% 7.18% 7.24% 8.18% 
% Hispanic 45.50% 45.52% 39.46% 39.54% 
Mean Previous # of Births 1.05 1.21 1.05 0.96 





Table 2-3 Distribution of Postpartum Length of Stay,  
July 1995 through August 1997 
 
 Vaginal Deliveries 
 Uncomplicated Complicated 
0 days 26,042 (4.77%) 8,867 (4.47%) 
1 days 416,116 (76.17%) 123,321 (62.12%) 
2 days 78,827 (14.43%) 40,588 (20.45%) 
3 days 9,279 (1.70%) 8,054 (4.06%) 
> 3 days 16,056 (2.93%) 17,685 (8.90%) 
Total Observations 546,320 (100%) 198,515 (100%) 
 Cesarean Deliveries 
 Uncomplicated Complicated 
0 days 868 (1.03%) 3,209 (2.51%) 
1 days 1,740 (2.06%) 2,629 (2.06%) 
2 days 35,001 (41.44%) 42,328 (33.11%) 
3 days 38,263 (45.30%) 53,515 (41.87%) 
4 days 3,112 (3.68%) 7,959 (6.23%) 
5 days 1,112 (1.32%) 3,164 (2.48%) 
> 5 days 4,366 (5.17%) 15,019 (11.74%) 
Total Observations 84,462 (100%) 127,823 (100%) 
Note: Frequencies of days of postpartum length of stay of newborns in pre law periods 





Table 2-4   Reduced-Form Regressions, Private Insurance and Medicaid Deliveries in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
























 Vaginal deliveries without complications 
(1,359,308 Observations) 
 Vaginal deliveries with complications 
(504,029 Observations) 
Federal law x 

















Federal law x 

















State Law x 

















State law x  

















Mean of Y 0.8093 1.3196 0.0406 8.6168  0.6659 2.2555 0.0571 8.9355 
R-squared 0.2571 0.0466 0.0035 0.3309  0.2184 0.0209 0.0089 0.2298 
  C-section deliveries without complications 
(238,553 Observations) 
 C-section deliveries with complications 
(326,173 Observations) 
Federal law x 

















Federal law x 

















State Law x 

















State law x  

















Mean of Y 0.8983 3.2112 0.0408 9.4327  0.7955 4.6239 0.0597 9.6565 
R-squared 0.1090 0.0299 0.0074 0.2785  0.1073 0.0361 0.0159 0.2064 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Sample means are for the pre-
law period.  Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of mother; race and education of father, sex 
and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary by 
health service area, payer, and hospitals size, and corresponding lower order interaction terms. 
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Table 2-5  Quantile Regression Results, Log (Total Charges) Equation,  
Private Insurance and Medicaid Deliveries in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
 Q=0.25 Q=0.50 Q=0.75 Q=0.25 Q=0.50 Q=0.75 
 Vaginal Deliveries without 
Complications  
(1,215,666 observations) 



























































Pseudo R2 0.2361 0.2395 0.2308 0.1977 0.1803 0.1457 
 Cesarean Deliveries without 
Complications  
(223,098 observations) 



























































Pseudo R2 0.2165 0.2288 0.2171 0.1783 0.1618 0.1327 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Unreported covariates include fixed effects 
for age group, race, education and ethnicity of mother; race and education of father, sex and 
birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 days admission index, day of the week, month, 




Table 2-6   Reduced-Form Regressions Logistic Regressions of Infant Readmission and Mortality Models,  


















 Vaginal deliveries without complications 
(1,359,311 Observations) 
 Vaginal deliveries with complications 
(504,029  Observations) 
Federal law x 

















Federal law x 

















State Law x 

















State law x  

















Mean of Y 0.0237 0.0299 0.0406 0.0006  0.0385 0.0452 0.0571 0.0020 
  C-section deliveries without complications 
(238,554 Observations) 
 C-section deliveries with complications 
(326,175  Observations) 
Federal law x 

















Federal law x 

















State Law x 

















State law x  

















Mean of Y 0.0235 0.0295 0.0408 0.0019  0.0415 0.0477 0.0597 0.0044 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time..  Sample means are for the pre-
law period.  Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of mother; race and education of father, sex 
and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary by 
health service area, payer, and hospitals size, and corresponding lower order interaction terms.  
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Table 2-7   2SLS Estimates of 28-Day Readmission Equation,  
Private Insurance and Medicaid Deliveries in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
 Deliveries without complications Deliveries with complications 
Covariate Vaginal C-sections Vaginal C-sections 
  









Observations 1,359,150 238,437 503,795 325,811 
  
2SLS Estimates, 28-Day Readmission as dependent variable 
(Using Federal Law*Private Insurance, Federal Law*Medicaid, State 













Observations 1,359,150 238,437 503,795 325,811 
P-value on test of 
Overid. restrictions 
0.0000 0.6686 0.5320 0.1038 
  
2SLS Estimates, 28-Day Readmission as dependent variable 
(Deleting data for 9/1997 through 12/1997 and using  













Observations 1,275,833 224,769 472,971 306,444 
P-value on test of 
Overid. restrictions 
1 0.9995 0.3633 0.9509 
 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a 
hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education 
and ethnicity of mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 
days old 28 days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, hospitals size, 





Table 2-8   Reduced-Form Regressions, Medicaid Fee-For-Service Counties and 
Counties with percent of Medicaid managed care < 10% in California, July 1995 
through December 2000 
 
 LOS < Mandated 
Time 
LOS in Days LOS < 
Mandated Time 
LOS in Days 
 Vaginal Deliveries without 
Complications 
(81,864 observations) 
Vaginal Deliveries with 
Complications 
(35,016 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.8344 1.2337 0.6590 2.0661 
R2 0.2277 0.1215 0.2229 0.2183 
 Cesarean Deliveries without 
Complications 
(14,910 observations) 
Cesarean Deliveries with 
Complications 
(21,244 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.9301 2.7225 0.8412 3.6570 
R2 0.1258 0.2828 0.1764 0.2301 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  
Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of 
mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 
days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary 







Table 2-9   Reduced-Form Regressions, Medicaid COHS counties (Percent of 
Medicaid managed care >10%) in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
 LOS < Mandated 
Time 
LOS in Days LOS < 
Mandated Time 
LOS in Days 
 Vaginal Deliveries without 
Complications 
(184,362 observations) 
Vaginal Deliveries with 
Complications 
(76,758 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.8479 1.2328 0.7239 1.9141 
R2 0.2756 0.0564 0.2481 0.028 
 Cesarean Deliveries without 
Complications 
(29,508 observations) 
Cesarean Deliveries with 
Complications 
(43,971 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.9044 3.0692 0.8067 4.2628 
R2 0.1527 0.054 0.1321 0.0533 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  
Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of 
mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 
days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary 





Table 2-10   Reduced-Form Regressions, Medicaid Two-Plan and GMC counties 
(Percent of Medicaid managed care >10%) in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
 LOS < Mandated 
Time 
LOS in Days LOS < 
Mandated Time 
LOS in Days 
 Vaginal Deliveries without 
Complications 
(1,005,098 observations) 
Vaginal Deliveries with 
Complications 
(351,223 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.7992 1.3468 0.6495 2.3645 
R2 0.2658 0.0462 0.2255 0.0181 
 Cesarean Deliveries without 
Complications 
(180,781 observations) 
Cesarean Deliveries with 
Complications 
(235,540 observations) 








































Mean of Y 0.8937 3.2956 0.7896 4.7904 
R2 0.1042 0.0277 0.1052 0.0323 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  
Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of 
mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 
days admission index, day of the week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary 





Table 2-11   Reduced-Form Regressions, Medicaid Deliveries in California,  
July 1995 through December 2000 
 
 LOS < Mandated 
Time 
LOS in Days LOS < 
Mandated Time 
LOS in Days 
 Vaginal Deliveries without 
Complications and Medicaid 
(625,023 observations) 
Vaginal Deliveries with 


















































































Mean of Y 0.7537 1.4261 0.6022 2.5332 
R2 0.2453 0.0489 0.2175 0.0256 
 Cesarean Deliveries without 
Complications and Medicaid 
(107,201 observations) 
Cesarean Deliveries with 


















































































Mean of Y 0.8916 3.3182 0.7698 4.8914 
R2 0.0752 0.0371 0.0927 0.0452 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a 
hospital over time.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  Unreported covariates include 
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fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of mother; race and education of 
father, sex and birth hour of newborns, 90-180 days old 28 days admission index, day of the 
week, month, hospital ownership, plus time trends that vary by health service area, payer, and 




Table 3-1   Descriptive Statistics of California Hospitals,  







(H0: Mean unionized = Mean non-unionized) 
No of hospitals 123 293 552 










%Church owned 7.85% 17.07% -2.81 
%Non-Profit Corporation 35.15% 42.28% -1.37 
%Non-Profit Other 3.07% 3.25% -0.10 
%For-Profit Corporation 30.38% 27.64% 0.56 
%County owned 7.85% 0 3.23 
%District owned 11.95% 8.94% 0.89 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3-2   Descriptive Statistics of California Hospitals that had Unionization 
Elections in period 1992-2000,  
at the end of year 1998 
 






(H0: Mean lost = Mean won ) 
No of hospitals 20 11  










%Church owned 10% 9.09% 0.08 
%Non-Profit Corporation 45.00% 45.45% -0.02 
%Non-Profit Other 10.00% 9.09% 0.08 
%For-Profit Corporation 35.00% 36.36% -0.07 




Table 3-3   Regressions of Average Hourly Earnings of Nursing Personnel on Payroll,  
Difference in Difference Regression 
 







    3.1845 0.7193 3609 
Log 
(RN wage) 















    2.7174 0.6811 3478 
Log 
(LPN wage) 















    2.3309 0.8295 3427 
Log 
(aides wage) 















    3.3125 0.6692 3340 
Log  
(manager wage) 















    8.1314 0.9787 3574 
Log (total 
discharge) 








8.1314 0.9787 3574 




    9.5281 0.9236 3519 








9.5281 0.9235 3519 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 




Table 3-4   Regressions of Average Hourly Earnings of Nursing Personnel on Payroll,  
Cross Sectional Regressions 
 







    3.1845 0.4341 3422 
Log 
(RN wage) 















    2.7174 0.3841 3297 
Log 
(LPN wage) 















    2.3309 0.498 3252 
Log 
(aides wage) 















    3.3125 0.3028 3172 
Log  
(manager wage) 















    8.1314 0.8642 3385 
Log (total 
discharge) 








8.1314 0.8642 3385 




    9.5281 0.375 3337 








9.5281 0.3748 3337 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 





Table 3-5   Regressions of Utilization of Hours of Nursing Personnel,  
Difference in Difference Regression 
 
Variables Won Lost Won1to2 Won3plus Lost1to2 Lost3plus Mean of Y R Squared Observations 




    11.4389 0.9709 3609 








11.4389 0.9709 3609 




    9.9511 0.8559 3464 








9.9511 0.856 3464 




    10.5487 0.8317 3425 















    0.5927 0.8851 3337 
RN hours/ 
(RN+LPN+aides hours) 















    0.1441 0.8138 3330 
LPN hours/ 
(RN+LPN+aides hours) 















    0.2609 0.8538 3337 
Aides hours/ 
(RN+LPN+aides hours) 








0.2609 0.8536 3337 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 




Table 3-6   Regressions of Total Cost of Nursing Personnel, Difference in Difference Regression 
 
Variables Won Lost Won1to2 Won3plus Lost1to2 Lost3plus Mean of Y R Squared Observations 




    14.6245 0.9716 3609 








14.6245 0.9716 3609 




    12.6438 0.8442 3479 








12.6438 0.8443 3479 




    12.8407 0.8205 3441 















    15.0640 0.9740 3393 
Log(RN+LPN+aides 
costs) 















    0.7238 0.8903 3393 
RN cost/ 
(RN+LPN+aides cost) 















    0.1231 0.8157 3393 
LPN cost/ 
(RN+LPN+aides cost) 















    0.1531 0.8854 3393 
Aides cost/ 
(RN+LPN+aides cost) 








0.1531 0.8753 3393 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 
fixed effects for month, year and hospitals. 
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Table 3-7   Regressions of Staffing Ratio of Payroll Nursing Personnel,  
Difference in Difference Regression 
 
Variables Won Lost Won1to2 Won3plus Lost1to2 Lost3plus Mean of 
Y 
R Squared Observations






    32.7710 0.8347 3556 
RN hours/Number of 
Discharges 








32.7710 0.8347 3556 




    2.1946 0.8975 3542 








2.1946 0.8975 3542 






    10.7409 0.8645 3431 
LPN hours/Number of 
Discharges 








10.7409 0.8645 3431 




    0.5108 0.7979 3432 








0.5108 0.7979 3432 






    21.9083 0.8948 3398 
Aides hours/Number of 
Discharges 








21.9083 0.8948 3398 




    0.9031 0.7989 3399 








0.9031 0.7989 3399 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 
fixed effects for month, year and hospitals. 
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Table 3-8   Regressions of Relative Hours and Utilization of Contract Nursing Personnel, Difference in Difference Regression 
 
Variables Won Lost Won1to
2 
Won3plus Lost1to2 Lost3plus Mean of 
Y 
R Squared Observations 
Log (Contract 





    3.5278 0.5568 1952 
Log (Contract 
Nursing Personnel wage) 








3.5278 0.557 1952 
Log (Contract 





    8.4116 0.6894 1956 
Log (Contract 
Nursing Personnel hours) 








8.4116 0.6891 1956 
Log(payroll+ contract 





    12.3350 0.966 1866 
Log(payroll+ contract 
nursing personnel hours) 















    0.0395 0.6049 1867 
Contract/total nursing 
personnel hours 








0.0395 0.6083 1867 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within a hospital over time.  Unreported covariates include 
fixed effects for month, year and hospitals. 
 
 113
Table 3-9   CPS merged Outgoing Rotation Group Union Status Change, 1984-2004 
 
Interviewees Month8 - nonunion member Month8 – union member 
Month4 - nonunion member 12,786(73.10%) 1,086(6.21%) 
Month4 – union member 1,062(6.07%) 2,558(14.62) 
Note: For all RN, LPN and aides interviewees in CPS merged Outgoing Rotation Group 
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Table 3-10   CPS merged Outgoing Rotation Group Sample Descriptive Statistics, 
1984-2004 
 
Variable RN Sample LPN Sample Aides sample Total Sample 








% College Graduate 74.08% 23.91% 8.99% 57.84% 
% White 87.31% 80.51% 65.39% 82.93% 
% Black 6.34% 16.53% 29.50% 11.29% 
% Hispanic 6.95% 7.57% 9.09% 7.37% 


































Observations 21,720 3,237 4,973 29,930 
Note: All samples are for full time workers with usual hours of working per 
week>=20 and hourly wage > $4.  Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3-11   Regression Results from Merged CPS samples,  


























































R Squared 0.8907 0.8604 0.8662 0.8682 0.7903 0.6968 













R Squared 0.8188 0.7735 0.8137 0.8775 0.8005 0.7051 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Unreported covariates include fixed effects 




Table 3-12  Regression Results from Merged CPS samples,  


























































R Squared 0.8315 0.7985 0.7922 0.7505 0.6856 0.5957 













R Squared 0.7311 0.6801 0.7131 0.7648 0.7055 0.6161 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Unreported covariates include age, 





Figure 2-1   % Postpartum Length of Stay of Newborns Less than 2 days,  
























Figure 2-2   % Postpartum Length of Stay of Newborns Less than 4 days,  























Figure 2-3   % Postpartum Length of Stay of Newborns Less than 2 days,  























Figure 2-4   % Postpartum Length of Stay of Newborns Less than 4 days,  





























































































Figure 2-8   28 Day Readmission Rate of Newborns,  





















Figure 2-9   28 Day Readmission Rate of Newborns,  






















Figure 2-10   28 Day Readmission Rate of Newborns,  























Figure 2-11   28 Day Readmission Rate of Newborns,  
























Figure 2-12   Newborn's 28 day Readmission Rate and  
90-180 Year Old 28 days Hospital Admission Rate,  























Newborns' 28 Days Readmission Rate




Figure 2-13   Newborn's 28 day Readmission Rate and 
90-180 Year Old 28 days Hospital Admission Rate,  






























Newborns' 28 Days Readmission Rate





Figure 3-1 Hospital Unionization Election Cases from National Labor Relation Board 


























Datar and Sood (2006) used public-use versions of the linked California 
hospital discharge data for the years 1991 – 2000 to study the effect of the Federal 
early discharge law.  The authors use three different outcomes:  hours in the hospital, 
28 day readmission rate and 1 year mortality rate of newborns.  In their data set, they 
do not have the birth date of newborns and could only identify the year of birth.   
Datar and Sood used an interrupted time series design to examine the effect of 
federal early discharge law.  Instead of estimating models for sub samples of 
deliveries, they pooled all births together in one model:  vaginal and cesarean births, 
private insured, Medicaid insured and uninsured births, and uncomplicated and 
complicated births.  Although they used their entire sample (1991-2000) for the hours 
of admission equation, they used data for a smaller subset of years, 1995 – 2000, for 
the 28-day readmission models.  Since we are using July 1995 to December 2000 data 
and also using the interrupted time series design strategy to examine the effect of 
early discharge law on California newborns, our results should be very close to results 
of Datar and Sood (2006).  However, Datar and Sood (2006) found a large impact of 
Federal law on 28 days readmission rates.  Specifically, they estimate the Federal law 
produced a 10 percent reduction the first year the law was in effect and almost a 30 
percent reduction of 28 day readmission rates by year 2000.  The increasing impact of 
the law over time is surprising since they do not find the impact of the law on hours in 
the hospital increases over time.  Their results are different from ours that in our 
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largest sample, uncomplicated vaginal deliveries, the federal law had a small and 
statistically insignificant effect on 28 days readmission rates 
Datar and Sood excluded all multiple-birth, premature and low birth weight 
newborns for their sample, and we only delete newborns with extreme low or high 
birth weight or extreme short gestation period.  So on average, our sample has a 
higher 28 days readmission rate and we work with four distinct subsamples in our 
study: complicated and uncomplicated vaginal and cesarean deliveries.  Given the 
small number of births this impacts and since these births are unlikely to be impacted 
by the law anyway, the difference of sample selection should not cause the large 
differences in the results. 
Datar and Sood examined the effect of federal law by estimating a model with 
a year time trend and 3 terms estimating changes in readmission rate 1,2, and 3 years 
after the passage of the federal law. Sine they do not have information of birth month 
of newborns and the California early discharge law took into effect in the middle of 
year 1997, they could not examine the effect of California law.  
Based on figure 2-8 and Figure 2-9 which depict the change of 28 day 
readmission rates over time, there was a noticeable increase in readmission rates in 
December of 1997, the fourth full month that the California law was in effect and the 
last month before the federal law took effect.   As we demonstrate in chapter 2, this 
was caused by the particularly heavy flu season in California that winter.  Datar and 
Sood do not control for this type of month-to-month variation in readmission rates 
because they do not have month of birth in the public use version of their data set.  
Since this large increase in re-admissions occurs right before the Federal law goes 
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into effect, using an interrupted time series design might make it look like the law is 
effective.  Their model also suggests that the pre-treatment trend in re-admission rates 
are positive so if readmission rates after the law stay constant, their model will also 
estimate an increasing impact of the law over time. 
To test this conjecture, we estimate versions of the models in Datar and Sood 
(2006) that control to a greater degree for the month to month variation in 
readmission rates.  First, we use our sample to replicate the basic results in their 
paper.  We construct a sample similar to theirs by pooling all deliveries into one 
model, we use our set of demographic characteristics, but, we initially ignore the fact 
we have the exact date of birth and add to the Datar and Sood (2006) model an annual 
time trend.  In the first row of Table A-1, we reports the logit regression results from 
this replication exercise.  Datar and Sood report the parameters from the logit model 
which is by definition the change in the log odds of a 28-day readmission generated 
by the law.  Since readmission rates are so low, this ends up to be very close to a 
percentage change in the risk of an admission, so we only report logit coefficients in 
Table A-1.   
We can replicate the statistically significant reduction in re-admissions as in 
Datar and Sood although we do not generate the large increase in the effectiveness of 
the law over time.  Overall however, as a first pass, our model is strikingly similar to 
theirs, especially in the 1st year of the law.  Their logit coefficient estimate was -0.093 
and we estimate a value of -0.083.   
In the next row, we estimate a model where we keep the annual time trend but 
now use the month of birth information in our restricted use sample and add a dummy 
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for the four months when the state law was only in effect, from September through 
December of 1997.  These results are reported in the second row of the table.  The 
result from this model suggest that the state law had a large positive effect on 28 days 
readmission rate which, as we argue in Chapter 2, is simply a result of the fact the law 
went into effect in a quarter when there were high re-admissions due to the cold and 
flu season.  However, by simply adding this dummy variable, the large impacts of the 
federal law during its first three years are almost completely eliminated.  Now, we 
estimate that the federal law has a small and statistically insignificant effect on 
readmission rates.   
Since the spike in September 1997 through December 1997 made the federal 
law look effective in the Datar and Sood (2006) model, we estimate some addition 
models where we successively eliminated months December through September.  
These results are reported in rows 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table A-1.  The results change a 
lot by deleting these few months.  These results provide additional evidence that the 
large impact of federal law estimated in the Datar and Sood paper was caused by their 
lack of data on the month of birth which prevented them from capturing the large 
spike in readmission rates for children born right before the federal law went into 
effect. 
 In Table A-2, we do the similar test on four sub samples used in our work: 
uncomplicated and complicated vaginal and cesarean delivery samples.  First we 
report regression results from the Datar and Sood model, and then estimate models 
that add in a dummy to capture the state law effect.  As in the results from Table A-1, 
we see that in the regression results for uncomplicated deliveries, not controlling for 
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the state law generates a large and statistically significant reduction in readmission 
rates but once we control for the state law, these results vanish.    
 In summary, due to the lack of the month of birth of newborns in their pubic 
use data set, Datar and Sood could not control the spike of readmission rates during 
the flu season just prior to implementation of the Federal law.  Their results are 
therefore contaminated by the extraordinarily high readmission rates during period 
September 1997 through December 1997.  Since we can identify month/day of birth, 
using 90 to 180 days old babies’ 28 day readmission index as a control variable and 
dummies for the state law, we could control for this one time shock in readmissions 





Table A-1   Logit Regression Results,  
Total Samples with Whether Readmitted within 28 Days as the Dependent Variable 
 
 1 Year after 
 Federal Law 
2 Year after 
 Federal Law 
3 Year after 














 4.64% 2,404,829 














































 4.64% 2,258,761 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  
Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of 
mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, year time trend, payer 
of deliveries and complicated or not. 
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Table A-2   Logit Regression Results,  
Uncomplicated Vaginal and Cesarean Delivery Samples 
 
 Datar and Sood 
Model 
With state law 
effect 
Datar and Sood 
Model 
With state law 
effect 
 28-Day Readmit. 
(Uncomplicated Vaginal Deliveries, 
1,353,623 observations) 
28-Day Readmit. 
(Complicated Vaginal Deliveries, 
499,422 observations) 
1 Year after 









2 Year after 









3 Year after 













Mean of Y 0.0406 0.0406 0.0571 0.0571 
 28-Day Readmit. 
(Uncomplicated Cesarean Deliveries, 
233,969 observations) 
28-Day Readmit. 
(Complicated Cesarean Deliveries, 
317,815 observations) 
1 Year after 









2 Year after 









2 Year after 













Mean of Y 0.0408 0.0408 0.0597 0.0597 
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Sample means are for the pre-law period.  
Unreported covariates include fixed effects for age group, race, education and ethnicity of 
mother; race and education of father, sex and birth hour of newborns, year time trend, and 
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